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ABSTRACT 
The 18 critical infrastructure sectors identified by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security form a vast and complex network of interdependent assets that 
supports the functioning of nearly every aspect of business, government, and commerce.  
The disruption of even one critical infrastructure sector by a terrorist attack or natural or 
manmade disaster is likely to have cascading effects on other sectors.   
As the Sector-Specific Agency for the Government Facilities Sector, the Federal 
Protective Service conducts recurring facility security assessments for approximately 
9000 federal facilities.  These federal facilities are interconnected in varying degrees of 
complexity and form a network of multi- or bi-directional connections between assets, 
within or between many types of systems, and within or across critical infrastructure 
sectors. 
This thesis presents a Policy Options Analysis of a cross-sector approach for 
protecting federal facilities across the United States.  These options seek to expand the 
security assessments conducted by the Federal Protective Service to include 
interdependency analysis at the operational and strategic levels.  These options may also 
serve as a model for other cross-sector security assessment methodologies that may be 
adopted by other critical infrastructure sectors. 
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A. THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCY NETWORK 
The 18 critical infrastructure sectors identified by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) form a vast and complex network of interdependent assets that supports the 
functioning of nearly every aspect of business, government, commerce, and life in general.  
The disruption of even one critical infrastructure sector by a terrorist attack or natural or 
manmade disaster is likely to have cascading effects on other sectors (Department of 
Homeland Security [DHS], 2009, pp i, ii, 1).  For example, nearly every critical 
infrastructure sector is dependent on the Energy Sector for electricity, natural gas, and 
petroleum-based fuels.  Nearly every sector requires water and wastewater treatment from 
the Water Sector.  Nearly every sector relies on the Information Technology and 
Communications Sectors for global voice and data connectivity. 
Since none of the critical infrastructure sectors operate in isolation, the question for 
homeland security professionals is, “Can we adequately protect our critical infrastructure 
without taking a ‘big picture’ view across the sectors rather than a sector-specific approach 
to protection?”  This thesis suggests that comprehensive security cannot be provided for the 
critical infrastructure of the United States without identifying and analyzing interdependent 
relationships between the 18 critical infrastructure sectors.  Such a large-scale, national-
level analysis is beyond the scope of this one thesis.  However, this thesis does present a 
policy options analysis of a cross-sector approach for protecting federal facilities across the 
United States.  These options seek to expand the security assessments conducted by the 
Federal Protective Service (FPS) to include interdependency relationships.  These options 
may also serve as a model for other cross-sector security assessment methodologies that 
may be adopted by other critical infrastructure sectors. 
The term “interdependency” is the most important term for one to understand while 
reading this thesis and considering the options presented herein.  As one will read in the 
literature review, the terms interdependency and dependency are closely related.  
Interdependency is defined as the multi- or bi-directional network connections between 
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assets, within or between systems, and within or across critical infrastructure sectors.  For 
example, a telecommunications network connected to a federal facility is an 
interdependency because voice and data flow in multiple directions across the network and 
support the operations of multiple facilities.  A dependency refers to a connection that is 
one-directional (DHS, 2006, pp. 103–104).  For example, a water supply is a dependency 
because the water flows to and is consumed within the facility.  While there is a minor 
distinction between the terms dependency and interdependency, they are so similar that only 
the term interdependency is used in this thesis for clarity and simplicity.  Additional terms 
related to this thesis are defined in the Appendix at the end of this thesis. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
FPS is responsible for the Government Facilities Sector, which is one of the 18 DHS 
critical infrastructure sectors.  FPS conducts recurring facility security assessments for 
approximately 9000 federal facilities that are under the purview of the General Services 
Administration (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE], 2007, p. 2).  These 
federal facilities, along with other critical infrastructure sectors, are interconnected in 
varying degrees of complexity and form a network of interdependencies.  For example, 
federal facilities operate on electricity and natural gas from the energy sector.  Potable 
drinking water and the disposal of waste water is provided through the water sector.  
Similarly, information sharing is dependent on infrastructure provided by the 
communications and information technology sectors and the movement of tangible products 
is supported by the Postal and Shipping Sector.   
The current FPS facility security assessment strategy does not examine this network 
of interdependencies formed by federal facilities and critical infrastructure sectors and how 
this network affects the security of federal facilities.  Virtually all elements of the current 
security assessment, including the threat assessment, risk analysis, and countermeasure 
recommendations, are internally focused on an individual building.  Consideration is not 
given to how the federal facilities are dependent on other critical infrastructure sectors, how 
the mission of the federal tenant agencies is supported by other federal facilities, or how 
each facility is impacted by other federal facilities. 
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Due to the limited scope of these assessments, vulnerabilities that exist in the 
network formed between federal facilities and critical infrastructure sectors may go 
unnoticed.  The risks associated with these vulnerabilities may not be mitigated and 
terrorists or criminals may exploit the vulnerabilities.  For example, FPS conducts security 
assessments for the offices operated by the U.S. Department of State’s Passport Services 
Directorate.  The Passport Services Directorate has a network of more than 9000 passport 
acceptance facilities, but there are only 13 Regional Passport Agency offices in the United 
States that receive, process, and produce passports (U.S. Department of State, 2008).  The 
current FPS security assessment strategy does not adequately address this type of network.  
Therefore, a criminal or terrorist attack on just one of the 13 regional offices may have a 
significant global impact on the thousands of passport acceptance facilities and citizens 
seeking passports.  
Another interdependency example is the public water supply system that supports 
approximately 50 federal facilities in the city of New Orleans.  Most of the pipes for the 
water distribution system were installed 80 to 100 years ago.  These pipes are deteriorated 
and the water pressure in the city is often inadequate.  Approximately four times per year 
federal facilities in the downtown area are closed due to low water pressure (New Orleans 
Sewage and Water Board, 2006, p. 9).  A long-term disruption to the public water supply 
would effectively close down critical federal operations at agencies such as the U.S. Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, the U.S. District Court, the U.S. Marshals Service, the Social 
Security Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Veterans Administration. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines the policy and process gaps in the current FPS security 
assessment strategy and answers the following primary research question: 
• How can the Federal Protective Service improve the security of federal 
facilities by identifying and assessing the network of interdependencies that 
exists between federal facilities and other critical infrastructure sectors?  
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The following secondary research questions are answered to properly address the 
primary research question: 
• Which interdependencies exist? 
• Can these interdependencies be identified? 
• Can the identification and assessment of these interdependencies be 
incorporated into the existing FPS security assessment strategy? 
• Which, if any, current FPS strategies or policies support the identification 
and assessment of interdependencies? 
• Can network theory be used to determine the appropriate allocation of 
security resources? 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The analysis of critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) interdependencies 
is rooted in the broad category of infrastructure protection.  Federal government policies, 
directives, and plans, along with scholarly works related to CI/KR, were reviewed for the 
purpose of addressing the primary and secondary research questions.  Both types of 
literature agree that CI/KR interdependencies exist and their analysis is a critical element of 
infrastructure protection.  The point of difference in the literature is in the solution to this 
challenge in terms of: whether the analysis should be quantitative or qualitative, whether it 
should involve complex simulation and modeling or be based on expert analysis and 
judgment, and the appropriate degree of complexity needed to produce risk data. 
1. Federal Government Documents 
The first set of literature on this topic consists of federal government documents.  
They include legislation, directives, strategies, policies, and standards that provide the 
framework within which the study of CI/KR interdependencies is conducted.  The strategies 
and policies range from federal legislation such as The Homeland Security Act of 2007 to 
tactical-level standards such as the Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal 
Facilities—An Interagency Security Committee Standard.   
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The research question is set within the context of risk management for federal 
facilities.  In particular, the question applies to the mission of FPS with regard to the 
protection of federal facilities across the country.  As a component of DHS, FPS is the 
primary federal office of responsibility for the Government Facilities Sector-Specific Plan 
(ICE, 2007, pp. 1, 3–4). 
Therefore, the starting point for this literature review is federal documents related to 
the protection of CI/KR.  These documents exist in a hierarchical structure beginning with 
federal legislation and cascading down through directives, strategies, plans, policies, and 
standards.  The general structure of the federal documents related to this research is shown 
in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Hierarchy of Federal CI/KR Documents 
 Type of Document Title of Document 
1 Legislation PL 107–56, Homeland Security Act of 2002 
2 Presidential Directive Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 
3 National Strategy National Strategy for Homeland Security 
4 National Plan National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
5 Sector-specific Plan Government Facilities Sector-specific Plan 
6 Sector-specific Standard ISC Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal 
Facilities 
 
The primary federal plan for the protection of CI/KR is the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP).  However, one should first understand the broader context of the 
NIPP and how it fits into the overall strategy for protecting the homeland.  This enables the 
researcher to understand how the network of interdependencies is addressed (or not 
addressed) throughout the hierarchy of federal homeland security documents.  The 
following sections trace the topic of interdependencies from legislation through sector-
specific standards. 
a. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296 
The primary purpose of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was to establish 
DHS.  While this Act does not specifically use the term interdependencies, it is the primary 
legislation for directing the protection of the homeland (DHS, 2006, p. 71).  Two elements 
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of the primary mission for DHS provide the basic framework for the protection of CI/KR.  
Those elements are: (1) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and (2) 
minimize the damage of and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks that occur within 
the United States (U.S. Congress, 2002, p. 8). 
There are also statements in the Act from which one can infer that the 
legislators understood the concept of interdependencies, although they did not use those 
exact words.  
Section 201 (3) reads:   
To integrate [emphasis added] relevant information, analyses, and 
vulnerability assessments (whether such information, analyses, or 
assessments are provided or produced by the Department or others) in 
order to identify priorities for protective and support measures by the 
Department, other agencies of the Federal Government, State and 
local Government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and 
other entities. (United States Congress, 2002, p. 12) 
Section 201 (6) reads:   
To recommend measures necessary to protect the key resources and 
critical infrastructure of the United States in coordination with 
[emphasis added] other agencies of the Federal Government and in 
cooperation with State and local government agencies and authorities, 
the private sector, and other entities. (United States Congress, 2002, 
p. 12) 
b. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) 
HSPD-7 lays the foundation for identifying, prioritizing, and protecting 
CI/KR and led DHS to the development of the NIPP.  Like the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, the terms dependencies and interdependencies are not used in HSPD-7.  However, 
two excerpts show that the writers of HSPD-7 understood the interconnected nature of 
CI/KR: 
• These critical infrastructures and key resources are both physical and 
cyber-based and span all sectors [emphasis added] of the economy” 
(White House, 2003a, p. 1). 
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• It is the policy of the United States to enhance the protection of our 
Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources against terrorist acts 
that could…have a negative effect on the economy through the 
cascading [emphasis added] disruption of other critical infrastructure 
and key resources. (White House, 2003a, p. 2) 
c. National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2007 
The 2007 version of the National Strategy for Homeland Security provides 
an updated framework for protecting the United States.  The 2002 version was updated 
based on five years of countering terrorist threats and the lessons learned from responding to 
natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina (Homeland Security Council [HSC], 2007, p. 1).  
The Strategy also makes the protection of CI/KR a key element of homeland security and 
domestic incident management (DHS, 2006, pp. 71–72). 
An interesting point is seen when comparing the 2007 and 2002 versions of 
the Strategy.  In the 2002 version, the protection of CI/KR is not listed in the three 
overarching strategic objectives.  It is listed at the second level of the strategic hierarchy as 
one of six critical mission areas (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. vii).  However, in 
the 2007, version the protection of CI/KR was elevated to one of the four strategic 
objectives for security of the homeland. 
The four goals of the 2007 Strategy are: 
• Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; 
• Protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key 
resources [emphasis added]; 
• Respond to and recover from incidents that do occur; and 
• Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term 
success. (HSC, 2007, p. 1) 
Within the hierarchy of federal homeland security documents, the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security is the first level where the term “interdependencies” is used: 
While the devastation of even one sector of our critical infrastructure 
or key resources would have a debilitating effect on our national 
security and possibly damage the morale and confidence of the 
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American people, interdependencies [emphasis added] make the 
protection of CI/KR particularly essential.  A failure in one area, such 
as our water supply system, can adversely affect not only public 
health but also the ability of first responders to provide emergency 
services.  Accordingly, ensuring the survivability of our CI/KR assets, 
systems, and networks requires that we continue to accurately model 
their interdependencies and better assess and understand the potential 
cascading effects that could impact and impede operations in 
interconnected infrastructures. (HSC, 2007, pp. 27–28) 
While the Federal government provides overarching leadership and 
coordination for protecting and mitigating the vulnerabilities of our 
Nation’s CI/KR, all partners in homeland security have important 
roles to play.  Our partnerships also extend to our international 
neighbors.  Many of our CI/KR assets are intertwined with a global 
infrastructure that has evolved to support modern economies. (HSC, 
2007, pp. 28–29)  
d. National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 
The NIPP was written to fulfill the requirements of HSPD-7 and provides an 
overarching, unified framework for protecting CI/KR across federal, state, territorial, local, 
tribal, and private sectors (DHS, 2006, pp. i, ii; DHS, 2009, pp. i, iii).  The authors of the 
NIPP identified three specific areas of concern related to interdependencies: cross-sector 
interdependencies, the cyber dimension, and the international aspect of critical 
infrastructure.  These areas provide more detail about the sub-levels of interdependencies 
within the national and international network of CI/KR.  The first area is cross-sector 
interdependencies.  The NIPP states that the CI/KR sectors form a network of critical 
functions and directs sector-specific agencies to consider relevant interdependencies when 
developing sector-specific plans (DHS, 2006, p. 12; DHS, 2009, pp. 9, 17, 21). 
The second area of concern in the NIPP is the cyber dimension of 
interdependencies.  The NIPP identifies the global cyber infrastructure as the backbone of 
the U.S. economy and a critical element of national security (DHS, 2006, p. 13; DHS, 2009, 
p. 12).  It also states that physical CI/KR should not be addressed independent from cyber 
infrastructure (DHS, 2006, p. 13; DHS, 2009, p. 12). 
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The third area of concern is international CI/KR protection.  The NIPP 
suggests that the international nature of threats and the global network of CI/KR assets (e.g., 
energy, transportation, and telecommunications) need special consideration within the risk 
management and vulnerability analysis framework (DHS, 2006, p. 13; DHS, 2009, pp. 12–
13).  The specific challenge of protecting international CI/KR is that much of it is outside of 
the U.S. and not under the control of the U.S. government (DHS, 2006, p. 14; DHS, 2009, 
pp. 12–13). 
Having laid the foundation for understanding the three sublevels of 
interdependencies, the NIPP then provides a risk management framework within which 
sector-specific agencies can identify critical vulnerabilities and allocate protection resources 
to mitigate the highest risk CI/KR (see Figure 1).  There are two key factors concerning 
interdependencies within the NIPP risk management framework: 
1. The identification of interdependencies through the National Infrastructure 
Inventory process.  The National Infrastructure Inventory is conducted during 
Step 2 of the NIPP framework (identify assets, systems, networks, and 
functions).  Interdependencies associated with the CI/KR assets, systems, 
networks, and functions are documented during this step. (DHS, 2006, pp. 
31–32; DHS, 2009, pp. 29–32) 
2. The assessment of the interdependencies is conducted during Step 3, which is 
titled “Assess Risk.” (DHS, 2006, p. 37; DHS, 2009, pp. 35–37) 
 
Figure 1.   NIPP Risk Management Framework (After DHS, 2006, p. 31; DHS, 2009, p. 
27) 
From the information presented above regarding the NIPP, one sees 
that DHS has documented the need to identify and analyze CI/KR 
interdependencies in the implementation of the national risk 
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management framework.  The question that must be addressed next is 
how FPS can accomplish this task.  The NIPP suggests two methods: 
(1) expert judgment or subject matter expertise; and (2) simulation 
and modeling. (DHS, 2006, p. 37; DHS, 2009, pp. 4, 17, 35) 
The expert judgment method involves a simple analysis of 
interdependencies without the aid of sophisticated software modeling 
and simulation tools.  The outcome yields less detail but might be 
more practical for many agencies and commercial enterprises. (DHS, 
2006, p. 37; DHS, 2009, pp. 4, 17, 35) 
The NIPP recommends simulation and modeling tools as a means to 
comprehensively analyze the impact of interdependencies within a CI/KR sector and across 
sectors (DHS, 2006, p. 88; DHS, 2009, p. 4).  DHS operates the National Infrastructure 
Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC), which is specifically charged with providing 
advanced modeling and simulation capabilities for this purpose (DHS, 2006, p. 37).  
Additional research will need to be conducted to identify the simulation and modeling tools 
that may be available from the NISAC. 
e. Government Facilities Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
Sector-Specific Plan as Input to the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (GF SSP) 
The GF SSP presents the application of the NIPP risk management 
framework to the protection of government facilities (DHS, 2007, p. I). Despite the 
comprehensive discussion about interdependencies in the NIPP, their analysis in the GF SSP 
is relegated to an appendix.  The authors simply define the term dependency and explain 
there are four types (physical, cyber, geographic, and logical) (DHS, 2007, p. 97).  No 
specific methodology for identifying and analyzing interdependencies is presented. 
f. Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities—An 
Interagency Security Committee Standard (FSL Standard) 
The FSL Standard is a tactical-level document used by FPS security 
inspectors to categorize federal facilities according to five equally weighted factors:  
mission criticality, symbolism, facility population, facility size, and threat to tenant 
agencies.  The FSL determination is based on a scale of one through five.  A Level I 
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building has a lower overall risk rating than a Level V building.  Interagency Security 
Committee (ISC) physical security countermeasure requirements increase as the FSL 
increases (Interagency Security Committee [ISC], 2008, pp. 5–6).   
The only reference to dependencies and interdependencies is in the 
“Intangible Factors” section of the Standard.  FPS security inspectors are encouraged to 
consider an increase in the FSL for factors that have the potential to impact other facilities 
and interdependent infrastructure.  The security inspector has the discretion to raise or lower 
the FSL one level (ISC, 2008, p. 13).  The risks associated with dependencies and 
interdependencies are not quantified, analyzed, modeled, or simulated.  Instead the GF SSP 
relies on expert judgment as identified in the NIPP. 
2. Scholarly Articles and Books 
Scholarly articles and books comprise the second set of literature that may offer a 
solution to the research question.  A review of the federal government documents reveals a 
gap between acknowledging that CI/KR interdependencies exist and a specific methodology 
or tool to identify and analyze them.  How does network theory apply to the Government 
Facilities Sector?  Are there additional details about interdependencies that can be added 
and applied to the federal plans and standards?  Do modeling and simulation tools exist that 
can be used specifically for the assessment of federal facilities? 
a. Network Theory 
The study of interdependencies is rooted in network theory and, more 
specifically, social network theory.  The study of interdependency networks begins with an 
examination of the basic elements of a small world network and how network theory began.  
This explains why the interdependency network within the Government Facilities Sector is 
so important to risk management and the allocation of critical infrastructure protection 
resources.  In his book Nexus: Small Worlds and the Groundbreaking Science of Networks, 
Mark Buchanan explains Stanley Milgram’s small world experiments to provide a basic 
understanding of social network theory.  Milgram designed an experiment to learn about the 
structure of social networks and how the networks are tied together.  He mailed 160 letters 
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through the U.S. Postal Service with the intention of determining the path through which 
those letters would be delivered.  The ultimate destination of all the letters was just one of 
Milgram’s friends.  Milgram found that the letters that reached his friend arrived through 
approximately six steps. He also learned that while the letters followed different paths, all 
the letters that reached his friend were ultimately routed through just one of three close 
friends.  This simple social network forms the basis of network development and network 
interdependencies (Buchanan, 2002, pp. 25–26). 
Buchanan also explained Mark Granovetter’s contribution to social network 
theory.  Granovetter contributed to Milgram’s theory by adding that social connections are 
not all the same.  In other words, some connections are stronger than others.  Social 
connections between close friends are strong and tend to include strong ties within a group 
of friends.  On the other hand, some social connections are relatively weak.  For example, a 
connection with an acquaintance is considered to be much weaker than a connection with a 
close friend.  One may assume that the stronger connections between friends and within a 
group of friends would be more important than relatively weaker connections between 
acquaintances.  Granovetter’s research showed this is not necessarily true.  The weaker 
social connections are actually social “bridges” that are critical to forming a social network.  
In other words, a social bridge is more vital to the network because it connects groups of 
close friends (e.g., a neighborhood) and reduces the number of steps or hops between people 
(Buchanan, 2002, pp. 41–43).   
The concept of strong and weak links may apply to interdependencies in the 
Government Facilities Sector.  Some interdependency links may be more important than 
others.  For example, the electrical grid may be more important for the operation of federal 
facilities than the delivery of letters and packages through the U.S. Postal Service.  A federal 
facility can remain operational without postal delivery, but it will be closed due to a lack of 
electrical power. 
Buchanan makes some interesting points regarding both the complexity and 
simplicity of networks.  He cites the work of mathematician Paul Erdos who used 
mathematics to show the interconnected nature of the global social network.  The point that 
Erdos made is that a small percentage of points in a group can be randomly connected and 
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the result will be a network that is virtually connected as a whole.  In other words, a simple 
group of unconnected points may easily be formed into an interconnected network with a 
few random links (Buchanan, 2002, pp. 36–37).  Buchanan also suggests that network 
theory can be used to gain “meaningful simplicity” from inherent complexities.  He states 
that mathematics can be applied to make sense of networks that seem to be too complex for 
human comprehension (Buchanan, 2002, p. 12).   
So how do the writings of Buchanan apply to the study of interdependencies 
in the Government Facilities Sector?  Buchanan himself noted that social network theory 
can be applied to other non-social puzzles to demonstrate that random links can actually 
form a network.  He used the example of developing a road network that connects towns so 
a driver may travel between any two towns without leaving the road (Buchanan, 2002, pp. 
35–36).  In a similar manner, this thesis suggests that the seemingly random network formed 
within the Government Facilities sector, and the inherent complexities, can be inventoried, 
analyzed, and possibly modeled to determine a pattern of interdependencies.  This pattern or 
model can then be analyzed and finite critical infrastructure protection resources can be 
applied according to risk management principles rather than random and/or uninformed 
decisions. 
b. Interdependency Network Characteristics 
(1)  No unified federal command.  The hierarchical organizational 
structure of the federal government makes the protection of CI/KR in general and federal 
facilities in particular very challenging.  This structure is typically referred to as being 
“stove-piped,” which means that federal agencies operate in isolation and command is 
focused on vertical linkages, not horizontal linkages.  Therefore, there is no one department 
that is in charge, especially of CI/KR (Lewis, 2006, p. 7).  Professor Ted Lewis explains that 
terrorist networks, in particular al Qaeda, are based on flexible social networking rather than 
the traditional hierarchical command structure used in the U.S.  Within this type of network, 
called a disintermediated network, data and information move quickly between points in the 
network; information is easily shared across the entire network, and decisions can be made 
faster.  Lewis contrasts this social network with the inflexible, “stove-piped” federal system 
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and suggests that poor coordination within the federal command structure produces seams in 
CI/KR protection, making CI/KR more vulnerable (Lewis, 2006, pp. 7, 12–14). 
This characteristic applies to the Government Facilities Sector 
because federal agencies operate their facilities with little or no coordination when it comes 
to CI/KR protection.  Agencies tend to be concerned only with the security of their 
particular federal facility without taking into account interdependencies that exist with other 
facilities or other CI/KR sectors. 
(2)  Vast and complex.  CI/KR in general is a vast and complex 
network of assets and interdependencies.  A brief list of CI/KR statistics provides one with a 
sense of the magnitude and complexity.  Within the U.S. there are approximately: 
• 2,800 power plants 
• 300,000 production sites for oil and natural gas 
• 5,000 airports 
• 120,000 miles of major railroads 
• 590,000 highway bridges 
• 26,600 FDIC insured banking institutions 
• 66,000 chemical plants 
• 104 commercial nuclear power plants 
• 80,000 dams. (White House, 2003b, p. 9) 
(3)  Random, scale-free, and small world.  Buchanan’s explanation of 
Milgram’s social networking experiments showed that seemingly random elements may in 
fact form a network (Buchanan, 2002, pp. 25–26).  This theory can be applied to the study 
of interdependencies in the Government Facilities Sector.  In a sense, the location of federal 
facilities and how they fit into the infrastructure network appears to be quite random when 
viewed across all federal departments and agencies.  Federal agencies do not necessarily 
collaborate with one another when they select a particular facility in which to conduct their 
operations.  They typically select their location and infrastructure linkages based on their 
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individual requirements.  The application of Buchanan’s and Lewis’s theories may show 
that the federal facilities network may not be so random.  Applying network theory may 
actually show that federal facilities form a scale-free network (a small number of hubs 
formed by a high concentration of links) or a small-world network (clusters of nodes) 
(Lewis, 2006, pp. 82–92). 
c. Additional Interdependencies 
Yacov Haimes suggests additional interdependencies that are not addressed 
in the federal documents.  For example, he identifies human, social, and organizational 
infrastructure elements (Haimes, 2002, p. 38).   
Human and social interdependencies exist within the Government Facilities 
Sector and should not be overlooked.  After all, the primary work of the federal government 
is social.  The preamble to the Constitution of the United States supports this claim.  The 
Constitution was written to “establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the 
common defense, promote general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves 
and our posterity…” (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007, p. 1).  Therefore, human and 
social interdependencies should be considered within the Government Facilities Sector.   
One should also consider the behaviors and perceptions of humans within the 
Government Facilities Sector as part of the human and social interdependencies.  Howard 
Kunreuther suggests that security issues related to interdependencies can be viewed from an 
individual perspective and a social perspective, and the two are likely to meet in relation to 
interdependencies (Kunreuther, 2007, p. 3).  He hypothesizes that two equilibriums exist in 
the protection of interdependencies.  Either everyone invests in interdependency protection 
or no one does.  Kunreuther explains that if one person or organization invests in 
interdependency protection then others are more likely to so (Kunreuther, 2007, p. 3).  The 
opposite may also be true in that if one person or organization does not invest in protection 
then others will not either (Kunreuther, 2007, p. 3). 
Kunreuther’s theory may apply to the Government Facilities Sector.  Federal 
agencies may look at the security practices and behaviors of other agencies and make risk 
management decisions based on perception.  An example of this is the U.S. Postal Service.  
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Many federal agencies rely on the U.S. Postal Service to screen mail and packages prior to 
delivery.  These agencies have a perception that they are protected.  But is this true?  Is their 
perception driven by a false understanding of U.S. Postal Service security practices?  Would 
they not be more secure if they understood the actual screening process and ensured their 
mail and packages are screened according to their own risk analysis? 
Organizational interdependencies exist in a network formed by federal 
agencies, departments, and subdivisions.  Federal organizational elements share information 
and intelligence and provide products and services to other federal entities.  An example of a 
federal organizational interdependency is the work performed by the General Services 
Administration (GSA).  Many federal agencies depend on GSA for real estate, engineering, 
and building maintenance services.  The loss or degradation of GSA services due to a 
terrorist attack or security incident may have a far-reaching impact on other federal 
organizations. 
The necessity of identifying and analyzing information technology (IT) 
interdependencies is emphasized by Chittester and Haimes.  CI/KR are interconnected 
through IT systems such as supervisory control and data acquisition systems, global 
positioning systems, satellites, intranets, and the Internet (Chittester and Haimes, 2004, p. 
1).  IT plays a significant role in the successful operation of federal facilities and for the 
agencies housed in those facilities.  In fact, the degradation of federal IT systems has a 
significant negative impact on the services provided by federal agencies.  Therefore, IT 
interdependencies should be addressed in any Government Facilities Sector risk 
methodology. 
Human, social, organizational, and IT interdependencies could be added to 
the list of interdependencies examined in the NIPP and GF SSP to expand the scope of the 
risk management framework. 
3. Conclusion 
Federal documents within the CI/KR hierarchy express the need to identify and 
analyze interdependencies; however, none of them provide guidance or policy about how 
this will be accomplished.  For FPS specifically, the NIPP and GF SSP call for the 
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identification and analysis of interdependencies within the DHS risk management 
framework, but both documents leave a gap in how these actions should be accomplished.  
DHS suggests the use of expert judgment and modeling and simulation as the general 
methods for interdependency analysis.  However, as the Government Facilities Sector-
Specific Agency, FPS does not currently use modeling and simulation and the use of expert 
judgment is questionable given the lack of a specific methodology in the GF SSP. 
E. ARGUMENT 
This thesis recommends a more strategic approach for assessing the security of 
federal facilities.  Rather than focusing exclusively on the assessment of a single federal 
facility in isolation, FPS should develop a regional security assessment strategy that 
accounts for interdependencies and interdependency networks.  Such a strategy would be 
used to identify and model the interdependency network across a selected geographic 
region.  This approach begins with interdependency identification and data collection at the 
tactical level.  This data would then be used by FPS security managers working at the 
operational and strategic levels of the organization to model and analyze the 
interdependency network and determine how to appropriately allocate finite security 
resources. 
The literature review identified that current federal government documents related to 
the protection of federal facilities call for considering interdependencies as a factor in the 
DHS risk management process.  These documents provide a framework within which a 
regional security assessment strategy would fit.  However, none of the documents, including 
the tactical-level standards used by FPS, provide a methodology for doing so.  A detailed 
analysis of federal policy was conducted to determine which FPS policies need to be 
modified to incorporate a regional security assessment strategy and which policies support 
such a strategy.  As the Government Facilities Sector-Specific Agency and a member of the 
Interagency Security Committee, FPS cannot make unilateral policy changes.  Therefore, 




modifying selected federal policies and standards within the current framework.  The 
recommended strategies fit within the current GF SSP and NIPP frameworks and support 
the use of the DHS risk management framework. 
F. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research is significant for FPS because it shows the importance of 
interdependency analysis and presents realistic and appropriate policy revisions to address 
the risks that may be associated with interdependencies.  The proposed policy 
recommendations seek to achieve two specific goals.  The first goal is to fill the policy gap 
in the identification and analysis of interdependencies that begins in the GF SSP and 
cascades down through FPS policies and directives.  The second goal is to recommend a 
more strategic approach to FPS security assessments and risk management by adding 
strategic- and operational-level security analyses. 
The immediate customer for this research is the Risk Management Division of FPS.  
The division director may approve, disapprove, or modify the policy recommendations that 
are made in this thesis.  If approved by the division director, the policy recommendations 
may be published by the FPS director in the form of an agency-wide directive and would be 
incorporated into the physical security training program.  Ultimately FPS security inspectors 
and regional managers across the United States would utilize the new policies to incorporate 
the identification and analysis of interdependencies into the building security assessment 
process.  Additionally, FPS stakeholders who rely on these security assessments would be 
able to make better informed decisions on how best to apply their finite security resources to 
adequately protect their facilities. 
Future research related to this topic should focus on elevating interdependency 
analysis to the national level for FPS.  This thesis recommends a regional-level perspective 
(i.e., a relatively large and well-defined geographic area) as an initial means to move beyond 
the current building-centric perspective.  The interdependency network actually extends 
beyond the regional level and security at multiple federal facilities may be affected by 
interdependencies that reach across the country or around the world. 
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G. METHODOLOGY 
The Policy Options Analysis method used for this thesis is based on the “Eightfold 
Path” presented by Eugene Bardach in his book titled, A Practical Guide for Policy 
Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem Solving.  The following policy 
analysis steps were adopted from Bardach’s path: (1) define the problem; (2) assemble some 
evidence; (3) construct alternatives; (4) select the criteria; (5) project the outcomes; and (6) 
decide (Bardach, 2005, p. xiv).  Bardach’s other two steps, “confront the trade-offs” and 
“tell your story” were incorporated into the other six steps for this thesis. 
The problem statement originated from the thesis author’s experience with 
conducting, reviewing, and evaluating FPS Building Security Assessments over a three and 
a half year period.  The problem statement was refined and validated by comparing the 
current FPS security assessment strategy to the interdependency analysis requirements 
contained in federal infrastructure policies and plans.  The literature review was used to 
gather evidence related to this topic and to develop the options presented in this thesis for 
solving the primary and secondary research questions.  Evaluation and selection criteria 
were developed based on the research conducted during the literature review.  The 
anticipated outcomes of each alternative were developed based on rating each alternative 
against the evaluation criteria.  The final outcome is the decision step in which the best 
policy alternative was determined and future steps were outlined. 
H. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II presents an analysis of the current FPS security assessment strategy.  
Maintaining status quo means that FPS security inspectors would continue to use their 
discretion in identifying and analyzing interdependencies.  In particular, this relies on the 
“Intangible Factors” section of the Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal 
Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard as the primary means through 
which interdependencies will be considered during the security assessment process. 
Chapter III addresses modifying the current FPS building security assessment 
process.  FPS Directive 07-004, Building Security Assessment Program, would be modified 
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to require the identification and analysis of interdependencies.  FPS security inspectors 
would identify 10 common interdependencies in accordance with the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan and the Government Facilities Critical Infrastructure and 
Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as Input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.  
Inspectors would then use expert analysis, as described in the NIPP, to determine the risk 
associated with the interdependencies. 
Chapter IV suggests modifying the Facility Security Level Determinations for 
Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard.  This option would require 
the inclusion of interdependencies when calculating the security level of each federal 
facility.  Rather than being an optional consideration, interdependencies would be the sixth 
element of the security level calculation along with mission criticality, symbolism, facility 
population, facility size, and threat to tenant agencies (ISC, 2008, pp. 4–13). 
Chapter V suggests developing a comprehensive regional security assessment 
strategy.  The purpose of a regional security assessment strategy would be to meet the full 
intent of the NIPP Risk Management Framework, which is to identify interdependencies and 
then analyze them using modeling and simulation (DHS, 2006, pp. 31–32, 37).  The 
outcome would be a regional security assessment that would be used to direct the allocation 
of finite security resources across a broad strategic area. 
Chapter VI presents an analysis of the four policy options and each policy option is 
evaluated using five criteria: compliance with standards, effectiveness, implementation, 
institutional acceptability, and time investment.  Chapter VI also suggests the best policy 
option based on the five criteria and presents future work related to the best option. 
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT FPS SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
STRATEGY 
The current FPS security assessment strategy relies on two elements related to 
identifying and analyzing interdependencies: increasing the Facility Security Level if 
interdependencies impact the security of a federal facility and identifying public utilities for 
the building being assessed.  Both elements rely on expert analysis carried out by FPS 
security inspectors. 
A. INCREASING THE FACILITY SECURITY LEVEL 
One of the first steps in the FPS security assessment is to calculate a Facility 
Security Level for a particular federal facility.  This calculation may be completed as early 
as the initial building or space identification and should be made early enough to 
accommodate installation and implementation of appropriate security measures.  A Facility 
Security Level is a numerical categorization that is used to determine the appropriate 
security countermeasures that should be implemented for an individual federal facility (ISC, 
2008, pp. 1–3). 
The final Facility Security Level determination is based on a scale of one through 
five.  On the lower end of the scale, a Level I building is characterized as having a mission 
that is not necessarily essential or vital for the functioning of the federal government, does 
not present a symbolic target to criminals and terrorists, has a population of less than 100 
people, is less than 10,000 square feet in occupied space, and has a low threat rating (ISC, 
2008, pp. 7–13).  A small office space in a rural town used by the U.S. Census Bureau is an 
example of a Level I facility. 
At the upper end of the scale, a Level IV building is characterized as having a 
mission that is considered to be a National Essential Function. The building is very 
symbolic of the federal government and is, therefore, an attractive target; has a population of 
more than 750 people; is greater than 250,000 square feet of occupied space; and has a high 
threat rating (ISC, 2008, pp. 7–13).  A large Internal Revenue Service office that services a 
large population in a major metropolitan area is an example of a Level IV facility. 
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Facility Security Levels II and III fit within the scale between the Level I and Level 
IV facilities.  A Level V facility is one that requires protection greater than that provided for 
a Level IV facility because of unique factors that are not accounted for in the standard 
Facility Security Level calculation.  For example, a facility may be the only one in the 
United States that provides a particular service or product to the federal government and, 
therefore, requires additional security measures to protect it.  A facility may also be highly 
symbolic and a very attractive target for terrorists and criminals.  The White House, the 
headquarters for the Central Intelligence Agency, and the headquarters for the Department 
of Homeland Security are examples of Level V facilities (ISC, 2008, p. 14). 
The Facility Security Level calculation is based on five equally weighted security 
factors.  These factors are mission criticality, symbolism, facility population, facility size, 
and threat to tenant agencies.  Each factor is assigned a score of one through four based 
specific criteria presented in the Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal 
Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard.  The scores assigned to each factor 
are added to produce a preliminary Facility Security Level (ISC, 2008, pp. 5–6). 
A sixth, non-weighted security factor, called an “Intangible Factor,” is then used to 
take into consideration special circumstances or conditions that may not be accounted for in 
the five equally weighted factors.  The FPS security inspector may use expert judgment and 
analysis to increase the Facility Security Level a maximum of one level due to 
interdependencies (ISC, 2008, pp. 5, 13).  Table 2 provides an overview of the five factors 
and how the current Facility Security Level is calculated. 
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Table 2.   ISC Facility Security Level Determination Matrix (From Interagency Security 
Committee, 2008, p. 6.) 
Points   
Factor  1  2  3  4  Score  
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B. IDENTIFYING PUBLIC UTILITIES  
The FPS security assessment methodology is called the Building Security 
Assessment Program.  Software called FSR-Manager supports the security assessment 
process and the writing of the Building Security Assessment.  The only element within the 
Building Security Assessment Program and FSR-Manager methodologies that considers 
interdependencies is contained in the section of the security assessment titled “Description 
of the Facility.”  In this section, the FPS security inspector is required to identify and 
document the public utility providers of electricity, natural gas, and water.  The only 
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information provided is the name and telephone number of the public utility that provides 
the particular service.  The inspector is not required to assess the vulnerabilities, levels of 
risk, and impact of loss associated with these utilities (Applied Research Associates, Inc., 
2001, p. 2–17). 
C. ASSESSMENT AGAINST EVALUATION CRITERIA 
Each policy option presented in this thesis was assessed using five evaluation 
criteria.  These criteria are compliance with standards, effectiveness, implementation, 
institutional acceptability, and time.  Table 3 summarizes the assessment of the current FPS 
Building Security Assessment Strategy against these criteria.  An explanation of the criteria 
is provided after the table to facilitate understanding. 





Effectiveness Implementation Institutional Acceptability Time 
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D. POLICY OPTIONS EVALUATION CRITERIA 
The policy options presented in this thesis were evaluated according to the following 
rank-ordered criteria that are defined below: compliance, effectiveness, implementation, 
institutional acceptability, and time investment.  
Compliance with standards is the degree to which the option complies with the NIPP 
and fits within the NIPP risk management framework.  This criterion is rated as compliant, 
partially compliant, or non-compliant.  Compliant means the solution conforms to the full 
intent of the 2009 NIPP risk management framework.  Partially compliant means the 
solution conforms to only part of the 2009 NIPP risk management framework and requires 
modification to reach compliance.  Non-compliant means the solution does not, in any 
manner, conform to the 2009 NIPP risk management framework. 
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Effectiveness is the anticipated degree of overall risk reduction associated with 
assessing interdependencies.  This criterion is rated as high, medium, or low levels of risk 
reduction.  A high level of risk reduction means the solution will improve the security of 
multiple federal facilities because interdependencies are factored into the assessments.  A 
medium level of risk reduction means the solution will improve the security of one federal 
facility because interdependencies for that particular facility will be factored into the 
assessments.  A low level of risk reduction means the solution provides minimal or no 
improvement in the security of a federal facility because interdependencies are not factored 
into the assessments. 
Implementation is the relative ease with which the option can be implemented across 
the FPS.  This criterion is rated as very difficult, moderately difficult, or simple.  A very 
difficult rating means the solution will require the revision of more than two FPS policies 
and a major revision of FPS physical security training programs.  A moderately difficult 
rating means the solution will require the revision of no more than two policies and 
conducting the associated training.  A simple rating means the solution will require virtually 
no policy revision and training. 
Institutional acceptability is the anticipated degree of acceptance across all 
organizational levels of FPS.  An acceptability rating of high means the solution is expected 
to be readily accepted by all FPS security managers and inspectors.  An acceptability rating 
of medium means the solution is expected to be readily accepted by FPS security managers, 
but not readily accepted by the security inspectors who conduct the assessments.  An 
acceptability rating of low means that the solution is not expected to be readily accepted by 
any FPS security managers and inspectors and a high level of demonstration will be required 
to gain full acceptance. 
Time investment is the amount of time necessary to bring the solution to full 
development and implementation within FPS.  This criterion is rated as major time 
investment, minor time investment, or minimal time investment.  A major time investment 
means development and implementation are expected to take more than two years.  A minor 
time investment means development and implementation are expected to take more than six 
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months but less than two years.  A minimal time investment means development and 
implementation are expected to take less than six months. 
1. Compliance with Standards 
The current FPS Security Assessment Strategy does not comply with the NIPP and 
the NIPP risk management framework.  While the NIPP does not provide a specific 
methodology for identifying and analyzing interdependencies, it does direct sector-specific 
agencies, including interdependencies in their risk assessments.  In particular the NIPP 
recommends that interdependencies should be inventoried during the “Identify Assets, 
Systems, and Networks” step of the risk management framework (DHS, 2006, pp. 12, 31–
32, 37; DHS, 2009, pp. 9, 17, 21, 29–32, 35–37).  The NIPP also recommends that those 
interdependencies should be analyzed using expert judgment or modeling and simulation 
during the “Assess Risks” step of the framework (DHS, 2006, pp. 12, 31–32, 37; DHS, 
2009, pp. 9, 17, 21, 29–32, 35–37).  As the Sector-Specific Agency for Government 
Facilities, FPS also briefly identifies the need to identify and analyze interdependencies in 
the Government Facilities Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan 
as Input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (GF SSP) (DHS, 2007, p. 97).  
Neither the direction from the NIPP nor the GF SSP is incorporated into the current FPS 
strategy because this strategy preceded both the NIPP and the GF SSP.  The first version of 
the NIPP was published in 2006, and the GF SSP was published in 2008.  Development of 
the 2007 Building Security Assessment Program was primarily based on the security 
assessment methodology presented in the 2001 FSR-Manager software.  Therefore, it is not 
difficult to determine that non-compliance with the NIPP interdependency assessment is due 
to the publication sequence of these documents rather than neglect of the issue on the part of 
FPS. 
2. Effectiveness 
The current strategy is assessed as having a low level of effectiveness in terms of 
reducing the risks associated with interdependencies. As noted previously, 
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interdependencies are not adequately identified and, therefore, are not assessed.  Therefore, 
the risks associated with interdependencies cannot be properly determined. 
3. Implementation, Institutional Acceptability, and Time 
Implementation is assessed as simple, institutional acceptability is rated as high, and 
time investment is rated as minimal.  These ratings are appropriate because the current 
Building Security Assessment Program has been in use since 2007 and most of that 
methodology, with some minor revisions, has been in use since 2001.  Policy revision and 
additional training are not required for maintaining status quo and the current strategy is 
already accepted by most FPS security managers and inspectors.  There is no time required 
for development and implementation.  
E. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
The current Facility Security Level and Building Security Assessment 
methodologies do not adequately address the impact of interdependencies on the security of 
federal facilities.   
First, the risks associated with interdependencies are not quantified and weighted 
equally with the five primary factors in the Facility Security Level calculation.  
Interdependencies are one of many factors that may be considered under the “intangible 
factors” in the Facility Security Level calculation.  Instead the calculation relies on expert 
judgment on the part of FPS security inspectors. 
The Facility Security Level calculation instructions incorrectly assume that FPS 
security inspectors can apply expert judgment for identifying interdependencies, including 
their impact on security in the “intangible factors,” and appropriately determine if the 
Facility Security Level should be increased a maximum of one level due to risks associated 
with interdependencies.  FPS security inspectors receive no education or training in 
identifying and analyzing interdependencies while attending the FPS Physical Security 
Training Program or during on-the-job training.  Field experience of the thesis author has 
shown that FPS inspectors do not know how to properly identify interdependencies and 
properly assess whether the Facility Security Level should be increased. 
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Even if FPS inspectors were trained to appropriately increase the Facility Security 
Level for a particular facility based on risks associated with interdependencies, the Building 
Security Assessment that is conducted following the Facility Security Level calculation does 
not support interdependency identification and analysis and the implementation of 
appropriate security countermeasures.  Simply identifying the providers of electricity, 
natural gas, and water is not enough for effective interdependency assessment. 
Maintaining status quo is presented in this thesis as Option I for the purposes of 
evaluating it against the evaluation criteria and comparing it against other options to 
determine the best policy option for FPS. 
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III. OPTION II: MODIFY THE FPS BUILDING SECURITY 
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 
A. OVERVIEW OF OPTION II 
Option II recommends modifying the FPS Building Security Assessment Program to 
include the identification and analysis of interdependencies.  FPS Directive 07-004, 
Building Security Assessment Program, would be modified with additional steps to require 
the identification and analysis of interdependencies.  FPS security inspectors would identify 
10 common interdependencies in accordance with the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan and the Government Facilities Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-
Specific Plan as Input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.  FPS security 
inspectors would then use expert analysis, as described in the NIPP, to determine the risks 
associated with the interdependencies. 
Within the context of this thesis, the term “expert analysis” is defined as an analysis 
that is conducted by one who has special knowledge about a particular subject.  This 
knowledge is considered to be above that which the average person would normally possess.  
Such a person may also be referred to as a subject matter expert and usually possesses 
education, credentials, or experience that can be verified and that qualify the person to be 
considered an expert (U.S. Legal, Inc., 2009).  FPS security managers and inspectors could 
be considered subject matter experts for the assessment of the security of federal facilities.  
They receive formal education and training in the Building Security Assessment Program, 
receive federal credentials that certify them as Law Enforcement Security Officers, and 
engage daily in assessing the security of federal facilities.  They are well-suited and 
prepared to learn and implement the specific elements of Option II. 
The general intent of Option II is to incorporate the identification and analysis of 
interdependencies within the current FPS security assessment framework.  This presents 
FPS with an option that does not require a major revision of the security assessment 
framework and methodology, takes a relatively short amount of time to implement, and will 
not require extensive training for FPS security managers and inspectors. 
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This option also intends to follow guidance provided in the NIPP that suggests 
expert judgment is an appropriate means for assessing interdependencies.  The writers of the 
NIPP acknowledged that the sophistication and level of detail provided by modeling and 
simulation may not be practical or necessary.  Therefore, expert judgment may provide an 
appropriate level of data in order to make risk management decisions (DHS, 2009, p. 35).  
This option presents such an alternative to modeling and simulation. 
Option II also follows NIPP guidance about tailoring risk management 
methodologies that apply to the specific assets within a critical infrastructure sector.  The 
NIPP suggests that the best approach to assessing fixed assets and physical facilities, such as 
federal facilities, may be a bottom-up, asset-by-asset approach (DHS, 2009, pp. 27–28).  
This option exploits the current facility-centric security assessment approach and adds the 
interdependency identification and analysis steps to the process. 
Option II involves incorporating elements of steps two through five of the NIPP risk 
management framework into the FPS Building Security Assessment process (see Figure 2).  
These steps are “Identify Assets, Systems, and Networks,” “Assess Risks,” “Prioritize,” and 
“Implement Protective Programs” (DHS, 2006, pp. 12, 31–32, 37; DHS, 2009, pp. 9, 17, 21, 
29–32, 35–37).   
 
 
Figure 2.   NIPP Risk Management Framework (After DHS, 2006, p. 31; DHS, 2009, p. 
27) 
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B. DETAILS OF OPTION II 
The following sections provide the details of Options II and the recommended 
modifications to the FPS Building Security Assessment process.  In general, FPS security 
inspectors would inventory 10 common interdependencies as part of the current inventory 
process, gather data related to these interdependencies, analyze threats related to the 
interdependencies and calculate risk ratings according to existing FPS criteria, and make 
countermeasure upgrade recommendations using the current process. 
1. Step 1: Inventory Interdependencies 
The inventory of interdependencies would be completed during the initial data 
collection step of the current security assessment process.  The FPS security inspector 
currently inventories the federal facility and documents information such as the locations 
and types of entrances and exits, mail and package delivery and processing procedures, 
parking in and around the facility, and neighboring facilities (Applied Research Associates, 
2001, p. 2–21). 
Option II recommends adding 10 common interdependencies and associated data in 
the existing “Facility Specific Details,” “Optional Topic” section of the FSR-Manager 
software data fields (see Figure 3).  The suggested interdependencies with associated 
definitions are listed in Table 4. The FPS security inspector should describe how the 
interdependency relates to the facility, in as much detail as possible, in the “Description” 
field in FSR-Manager.  This description should include the capabilities provided to the 
facility by the interdependency, links within the facility and with other facilities, and the 
consequence cost to the tenants in terms of interdependency failure or replacement (Lewis, 
2006, p. 110).  
The 10 interdependencies and the associated descriptions will be automatically 
transferred to and documented in the “Description of the Facility” section of the Building 
Security Assessment as part of the data output from the FSR-Manager software.  The FPS 
security inspector can then use this information when making expert judgments during the 
risk rating step in the current security assessment process. 
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Table 4.   Common Interdependencies for Federal Facilities 
Interdependency Definition 
Electrical Power Primary and backup electrical power sources 
Natural Gas Supply Primary natural gas supply 
Water Supply Primary water supply 
Waste Water Disposal Primary wastewater disposal system 
Communications 
Voice services provided from or utilized 
by federal tenant agencies.  These 
include terrestrial, satellite, and 
wireless transmission systems (DHS, 
2009) 
Information Technology 
Hardware, software, and IT systems 
provided or utilized by federal tenant 
agencies.  This includes all classified 
and unclassified Internet connections 
provided or utilized by federal tenant 
agencies (DHS, 2009) 
Postal Service 
Small- and medium-size packages 
delivered and retrieved by the U.S. 
Postal Service (DHS, 2009) 
Shipping Services 
Small- and medium-size packages 
delivered and retrieved by the 
commercial courier services (DHS, 
2009) 
Organizational Connections 
Sharing of information, intelligence, 
products or services within and 
between organizational elements 
Human and Social Factors 
Human and social behaviors that exist 
within the facility and between facilities 






Figure 3.   Screen Shot of Facility Specific Details Page in FSR-Manager 
2. Step 2: Analyze Interdependencies 
The analysis of the 10 common interdependencies would be completed during the 
risk rating step in the current FPS security assessment process.  Using the current process, 
the FPS security inspector conducts a threat-based risk assessment that is described below. 
The inspector begins by rating each threat that was identified during the data 
collection phase of the process using two categories.  The first category is impact of loss, 
which is defined as the “degree to which the mission of the tenant(s) is impaired by a 
successful attack from the given threat.”  High, moderate, and low impact of loss ratings are 
assigned to each threat according to the following criteria: 
• High: “Complete loss of assets/mission capability or extreme impairment of 
mission capability is expected for an indefinite period of time.” 
• Moderate: “Noticeable impact of mission capability or loss of major assets is 
expected for a limited period of time.” 
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• Low: “No noticeable impact on mission capability or loss of major assets is 
expected.” (Applied Research Associates, 2001 pp. 2-32, 2-33) 
The second category is vulnerability, which is defined as “a combination of the 
attractiveness of a facility as a target and the level of deterrence and/or defense provided by 
the existing countermeasures.”  High, moderate, and low vulnerability ratings are assigned 
to each threat according to the following criteria: 
• High: “The facility is an attractive target, and the existing countermeasures 
are providing little or no deterrence and/or defense.” 
• Moderate: “The facility is an attractive target, and the existing 
countermeasures are providing a moderate level of deterrence and/or 
defense.” 
• Low: “The facility is not an attractive target, and the existing 
countermeasures are providing a high level of deterrence and/or defense.” 
(Applied Research Associates, 2001, p. 2-33) 
The final step in the risk rating process is to determine a combined risk rating for 
each threat using the previously assigned impact of loss and vulnerability ratings.  This is 
accomplished by using Tables 5 and 6 that show how to determine each rating. 
 
Table 5.   Combined Risk Ratings (From Applied Research Associates, 2001, pp. 2-33, 
2-34) 
Matrix for Risk Ratings 
 Vulnerability to Threat 
Impact of Loss High Moderate Low 
High    
Moderate    
Low    
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Table 6.   Explanation of Risk Ratings (From Applied Research Associates, 2001, pp. 2-
33, 2-34) 
Explanation of Risk Ratings 
 
These risks are high.  A countermeasure must be implemented to 
mitigate high risk threats. 
 
These risks are moderate.  Countermeasure implementation is at the 
discretion of the Building Security Committee and tenant agencies. 
 
These risks are low.  Countermeasure implementation is at the 
discretion of the Building Security Committee and tenant agencies. 
 
Option II suggests adding steps to the analysis process in order to properly assess the 
security vulnerabilities that may exist due to interdependencies.  The FPS security inspector 
gathered pertinent interdependency data during the inventory phase of the security 
assessment.  At this point in the assessment process, the FPS security inspector should be 
able to answer the following questions regarding the 10 common interdependencies: 
• What capabilities are provided to the facility by the interdependency? 
• What links exist within the facility and with other facilities? 
• What consequence costs are there to the tenants in terms of interdependency 
failure or replacement? (Lewis, 2006, p. 110) 
Within the current FPS Building Security Assessment Program and FSR-Manager 
frameworks, the answers to these interdependency questions should provide enough 
information for the FPS security inspector to make an expert judgment regarding the 
security threats that may be present due to one or more of the interdependencies.  For 
example, the inventory and analysis may show that critical telecommunications equipment 
in the facility that must operate at all times to support operations external to the facility is 
not connected to any type of electrical backup power system and the electrical power supply 
may not be adequately protected by the commercial electric provider.  The costs of electrical 
power failure in terms of lose of mission capability and continuity of operations may far 
exceed the cost of installing a backup electrical power generator. 
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Another example is that a review of organizational connections may reveal that the 
facility is a one-of-a-kind center or one-of-a-few centers for producing a specific product on 
behalf of the federal government.  This is the case with passport production offices 
throughout the United States.  The cost of a successful attack on such a facility in terms of 
delays in production and duplicating the work effort at another location may far exceed the 
cost of adequate security countermeasures. 
The FPS security inspector should then use the current threat-based risk assessment 
process previously described in this chapter to analyze potential threats to the 
interdependencies.  This includes assessing the impact of loss if there were a successful 
attack on the interdependency and the vulnerability of the interdependency to the threat.  
Using the previous electrical power failure example illustrates this process. 
An FPS security inspector may find during the inventory that a facility does not have 
a backup electrical power system.  By using the steps suggested in Option II, the inspector 
may find that the critical telecommunications equipment in the facility supports agencies 
who do not occupy the facility and they may not be aware that their critical equipment will 
not function if there were to be an electrical power outage.  By calculating the consequence 
costs related to the failure or replacement of the telecommunications equipment, the FPS 
security inspector may determine that the loss of electrical power to the facility is a threat.  
Table 7 shows what this risk analysis would look like in the current Building Security 
Assessment format. 
Table 7.   Interdependency Threat Example 
Current Threat Ratings 
Threat Impact Of Loss Vulnerability Combined Risk 
Loss of Electrical Power Moderate Moderate Moderate 
 
Table 8 shows how the FPS security inspector would justify the loss of electrical 
power to the facility as a credible threat using the current FPS Building Security Assessment 
Program and the FSR-Manager software. 
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Table 8.   Credible Threats Example 
Credible Threats for this Facility 
Threat Justification—Why Credible 
Loss of electrical power 
to the facility 
Loss of electrical power would cause a failure of the 
communications equipment for agencies housed in this facility 
and for operations at X number of other facilities.  The cost of 
loss of mission capability is expected to be X number of hours 
and X number of dollars. 
 
3. Steps 3 and 4: Prioritize and Implement Protective Programs 
During the next step in the process, the FPS security inspector uses the overall risk 
ratings to develop countermeasure recommendations for the facility being assessed.  These 
countermeasures are prioritized and implemented according to mandatory and optional 
categories.  A mandatory countermeasure is defined as one that mitigates a high-risk threat 
and an optional countermeasure mitigates a moderate- or low-risk threat.  Both types of 
countermeasures must meet minimum standards set forth by the Interagency Security 
Committee, the Department of Justice, or a nationally recognized security standard.  After 
completing the security assessment, the FPS security inspector presents the overall risk 
ratings and the countermeasures to representatives from the tenant agencies and they decide 
which countermeasures they are willing to fund and implement (Federal Protective Service, 
2007, p. 8).  The FSR-Manager software automatically suggests countermeasures based on 
the data input.  Table 9 lists the possible countermeasures from which the FPS security 
inspector may choose for the mandatory and optional countermeasures.  The FPS security 
inspector may add custom countermeasures into the assessment as long as the 
countermeasures meet the minimum standards referenced above. 
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Table 9.   Master List of Suggested Security Countermeasures from FSR Manager 
MASTER LIST OF COUNTERMEASURES 
Air Intake Access Control 
Awareness Training 
Closed-Circuit Television 
Chemical Agent Detection 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design 
Duress Alarms 
Electronic Access Control 
Emergency Power Source 










Occupant Emergency Plan 









Visitor ID System 
Water Supply Access Control 
Window Protection 
X-Ray Mail Screening 
X-Ray Visitor Screening 
Option II suggests the use of the same process for prioritization and implementation 
of security countermeasures.  The FPS security inspector would use the data from the risk 
ratings analysis and determine appropriate security countermeasures based on the criteria 
that are listed the previous paragraph.  Using the electrical power failure example, Table 10 
shows what this countermeasure recommendation would look like in the current Building 
Security Assessment format. 
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Table 10.   Interdependency Countermeasure Recommendation 
Countermeasure Upgrade Descriptions 
Package 
Name Countermeasure Description 
Optional 
Package 
Backup electrical power 
generator 
A backup electrical power generator should be 
installed to operate the critical 
communications equipment in this facility.  
The generator should be capable of providing 
X number of kilowatts of electricity for X 
number of hours. 
The final step in the current FPS Building Security Assessment process is to 
determine the projected combined risk rating if the recommended countermeasure is 
implemented.  The FPS security inspector uses expert judgment to determine the anticipated 
change in impact of loss and vulnerability ratings, which then provide the projected 
combined risk rating.  The objective is to show that the recommended countermeasure will 
result in a lower combined risk rating and, therefore, should be implemented.  Table 11 
shows how the installation of a backup electrical power generator might lower the combined 
risk of the threat of electrical power loss. 
Table 11.   Projected Threat Ratings Example 
Projected Threat Ratings After Upgrades 
Package Name Threat Impact Of Loss Vulnerability 
Combined 
Risk 
Optional Package Loss of electrical 
power Low Moderate Low 
C. ASSESSMENT AGAINST EVALUATION CRITERIA 
As stated in Chapter II, each policy option is assessed using five evaluation criteria.  
These criteria are compliance with standards, effectiveness, implementation, institutional 
acceptability, and time.  Table 12 summarizes the assessment of Option II against these 
criteria.   
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1. Compliance with Standards 
Option II is partially compliant with the NIPP and the NIPP risk management 
framework.  This option complies with the NIPP recommendation to inventory 
interdependencies during the “Identify Assets, Systems, and Networks” step of the 
framework.  Using Option II the FPS security inspector would identify 10 common 
interdependencies that may exist for the federal facility being assessed and document the 
capabilities provided to the facility by the interdependency, links within the facility and with 
other facilities, and the consequence cost to the tenants in terms of interdependency failure 
or replacement.   
The interdependency data would then be assessed in compliance with the NIPP 
recommendation that interdependencies should be analyzed using expert judgment or 
modeling and simulation during the “Assess Risks” step of the risk management framework 
(DHS, 2006, pp. 12, 31–32, 37; DHS, 2009, pp. 9, 17, 21, 29–32, 35–37).  The FPS security 
inspector would use expert judgment in assessing the security impact of interdependencies 
within the current FPS Building Security Assessment Program and FSR-Manager 
frameworks. 
Option II is partially compliant with the NIPP because it does not address 
interdependency networks.  The NIPP directs Sector-Specific Agencies to consider relevant 
cross-sector interdependencies when developing Sector-Specific Plans (DHS, 2006, p. 12; 
DHS, 2009, pp. 9, 17, 21).  Modifying only the FPS Building Security Assessment Program 
process does not expand the interdependency assessment beyond the facility being assessed.  
While Option II expands the FPS Building Security Assessment Program by including 10 




Option II is assessed as resulting in a medium level of risk reduction.  This option 
will improve the security of one federal facility because interdependencies for that particular 
building will be factored into the assessments.  In order to be assessed as providing a high 
level of risk reduction, this option would have to incorporate the assessment of multiple 
federal facilities and their associated interdependencies.  The current FPS Building Security 
Assessment Program and the FSR-Manager would have to be significantly revised.  Both 
methodologies were designed for the assessment of only one facility. 
3. Implementation 
Implementation of Option II is assessed as being moderately difficult because it will 
require the revision of only one policy and methodology.  This option takes advantage of 
using the current FPS Building Security Assessment Program and FSR-Manager 
framework.  Rather than recommending a complete revision of the methodology, Option II 
incorporates NIPP-compliant interdependency identification and analysis into the current 
process.  A critical element of implementation will be additional training for the FPS 
security inspectors in the field.  They will need to learn how to identify the 10 common 
interdependencies suggested in this option, how to analyze those interdependencies within 
the current FPS security assessment process, and then how to make appropriate 
countermeasure recommendations to mitigate the risks that have been identified. 
4. Institutional Acceptability 
The acceptability rating for Option II is assessed as medium.  Option II is expected 
to be readily accepted by FPS security managers but not readily accepted by the security 
inspectors who conduct the assessments.  FPS security managers are expected to have a 
better understanding of the NIPP and the NIPP risk management framework.  Therefore, 
they may be more inclined to understand and accept recommendations to update the FPS 
Building Security Assessment Program to include the identification and analysis of 
interdependencies. 
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FPS security inspectors are not educated in or required to understand the NIPP and 
the NIPP risk management framework.  They are almost exclusively focused on the tactical-
level Building Security Assessment for each facility to which they are assigned.  Therefore, 
like many significant policy changes, FPS security inspectors are expected to be reluctant to 
add more steps and additional analysis to an already extensive and comprehensive 
assessment process.  The key to increasing institutional acceptability will be an effective 
training program. 
5. Time 
Option II is assessed as requiring a minor time investment.  Overall development and 
implementation are expected to take less than two years.  The current FSR-Manager 
software will not have to be modified to accommodate the recommendations in this option.  
Modifying the FPS Building Security Assessment Program will require approximately six 
months for incorporating these recommendations and publishing it as an official directive.  
Approximately six months will be required for the 11 regional Law Enforcement and 
Security Program Managers to be trained in the new methodology and for these managers to 
train the FPS security inspectors in their respective regions. 
D. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Option II would provide FPS with an acceptable and moderately difficult 
methodology to incorporate interdependency identification and analysis.  Use of the NIPP’s 
expert judgment method makes Option II an acceptable alternative because it involves a 
simple analysis of interdependencies without the aid of sophisticated software modeling and 
simulation tools.  While the outcome provides less detail than a more sophisticated 
modeling and simulation approach may provide, Option II is much more practical from the 
implementation, institutional acceptability, and time perspectives (DHS, 2006, p. 37; DHS, 
2009, pp. 4, 17, 35). 
However, Option II’s reliance on expert judgment may lead to inconsistent risk 
calculations and assessments.  Each FPS security inspector may assess the 10 common 
interdependencies differently and recommend different countermeasures. 
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IV. OPTION III: MODIFY THE FACILITY SECURITY LEVEL 
DETERMINATIONS FOR FEDERAL FACILITIES: AN 
INTERAGENCY SECURITY COMMITTEE STANDARD 
A. INTRODUCTION TO OPTION III 
Option III was developed because the current Facility Security Level Determinations 
for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard recommends that FPS 
security inspectors consider interdependencies when calculating the Facility Security Level 
(ISC, 2008, p. 13). Therefore, it is reasonable to present an option that modifies this 
Standard to better address interdependency vulnerabilities and risks.  Chapter II of this 
thesis provides a detailed explanation and assessment of the current Facility Security Level 
calculation.  The assessment concluded that this calculation does not adequately address 
interdependencies and Option III was developed to address these inadequacies.  A summary 
of the assessment from Chapter II is included below as an introduction to this chapter. 
The first inadequacy of the current Facility Security Level calculation is that the 
risks associated with interdependencies are not quantified and equally weighted with the 
five primary factors in the calculation.  Instead, interdependencies are relegated to a 
subordinate, non-weighted factor in the calculation under the “Intangible Factors” section.  
Interdependencies are simply suggested as one of many conditions that may be considered 
in addition to the five primary factors.  Therefore, the FPS security inspector either does not 
include interdependency analysis in the calculation or interdependencies are analyzed 
amongst other non-related factors in this section. 
The second inadequacy is the calculation relies on expert judgment on the part of 
FPS security inspectors.  The Facility Security Level calculation instructions incorrectly 
assume that FPS security inspectors can apply expert judgment for identifying 
interdependencies, including their impact on security in the “Intangible Factors,” and 
appropriately determine if the Facility Security Level should be increased a maximum of 
one level due to risks associated with interdependencies.  FPS security inspectors receive no 
education or training in identifying and analyzing interdependencies.  Therefore, it is 
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unlikely that FPS security inspectors will consider interdependencies in the “Intangible 
Factors” and the risks associated with interdependency vulnerabilities may not be mitigated.  
Additionally, if the FPS security inspector does consider interdependencies, there is no 
standard methodology to provide a consistent and repeatable manner in which to inventory 
and assess the interdependencies. 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE FACILITY SECURITY LEVEL CALCULATION 
A brief overview of the current Facility Security Level calculation is provided in this 
chapter to enhance the reader’s understanding of the recommendations included in Option 
III. 
A Facility Security Level is a numerical categorization that is used to determine the 
appropriate security countermeasures that should be implemented for an individual federal 
facility (ISC, 2008, pp. 1–3).  The final Facility Security Level is based on a scale of I 
through V.  The calculation is based on five equally-weighted security factors:  mission 
criticality, symbolism, facility population, facility size, and threat to tenant agencies.  Each 
factor is assigned a score of one through four based on specific criteria presented in the 
Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security 
Committee Standard.  The scores assigned to each factor are added to produce a preliminary 
Facility Security Level (ISC, 2008, pp. 5–6). 
Interdependency consideration is included as one of several elements of a sixth, non-
weighted security factor, called an “Intangible Factor.”  The FPS security inspector may use 
expert judgment and analysis to increase the Facility Security Level a maximum of one level 
due to interdependencies (ISC, 2008, pp. 5, 13).  Table 13 provides an overview of the five 
factors and how the current Facility Security Level is calculated. 
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Table 13.   Current ISC Facility Security Level Determination Matrix (From Interagency 
Security Committee, 2008, p. 6) 
Points   
Factor  1  2  3  4  Score  
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C. OVERVIEW OF OPTION III 
Option III recommends modifying the Facility Security Level Determinations for 
Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard to include 
interdependencies when calculating the security level of each federal facility.  Rather than 
being an optional consideration, interdependencies would be the sixth factor of the Facility 
Security Level calculation and be equally weighted with mission criticality, symbolism, 
facility population, facility size, and threat to tenant agencies (ISC, 2008, pp. 4–13).  A 
value, points, and criteria matrix, matching those in the current standard, is presented in 
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order to equally weight interdependencies with the other five factors.  This approach may 
increase the Facility Security Level for buildings that have critical interdependencies and 
thus require more security countermeasures to protect the facility.  
D. DETAILS OF OPTION III 
As previously stated, Option III utilizes the same calculation and process steps used 
in the current Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities: An Interagency 
Security Committee Standard.  The proposed option adds the identification and analysis of 
interdependencies into the calculation.  The recommended process steps are explained in the 
following paragraphs and the modified scoring tables and matrices are included in the 
explanation of each step.  The six steps recommended in Option III are: 
• Step 1: Analyze Six Primary Factors 
• Step 2: Determine the Overall Value and Points for all Primary Factors  
• Step 3: Utilize a Modified Facility Security Level Calculation Matrix 
• Step 4: Utilize a Modified Rating Scale to Determine the Preliminary Facility 
Security Level 
• Step 5: Determine Changes in the Preliminary Facility Security Level based 
on Intangible Factors 
• Step 6: Determine the Final Facility Security Level 
1. Step 1: Analyze Six Primary Factors 
Option III begins with using the existing Facility Security Level Determinations for 
Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard to analyze the primary 
factors of mission criticality, symbolism, facility population, facility size, and threat to 
tenant agencies.  The proposed option recommends using the 10 common interdependencies 
that were used in Option II (see Table 14) to inventory interdependencies.  The FPS security 
inspector would determine which of the 10 interdependencies exist and then document the 
capabilities provided to the facility by the interdependencies, interdependency links within 
the facility and with other facilities, and the consequence cost to the tenants in terms of 
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interdependency failure or replacement (Lewis, 2006, p. 110).  This data would be used in 
Step 2 of Option III to determine the overall value and points that should be assigned to the 
“Interdependencies” factor. 
The first reason for this step is to clearly define the interdependencies that should be 
identified and assessed within the context of the Facility Security Level calculation.  The 
current Facility Security Level calculation does not provide clear guidance to the FPS 
security inspector about which interdependencies to assess.  Therefore, using the 10 
common interdependencies would provide clear and consistent direction to the security 
inspector.  The second reason is to reduce, as reasonably as possible, the calculation-specific 
judgment that must be made on the part of the FPS security inspectors.  This facilitates 
consistency in applying the calculation to different facilities across the country.  The third 
reason is to provide a level of consistency between the recommendations made in Options II 
and III.  This is an aspect that will be important for the recommendations made in Option 
IV, which suggests a hybrid approach using Options II and III. 
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Table 14.   Common Interdependencies for Federal Facilities 
Interdependency Definition 
Electrical Power Primary and backup electrical power sources 
Natural Gas Supply Primary natural gas supply 
Water Supply Primary water supply 
Waste Water Disposal Primary wastewater disposal system 
Communications 
Voice services provided from or utilized 
by federal tenant agencies.  These 
include terrestrial, satellite, and 
wireless transmission systems (DHS, 
2009) 
Information Technology 
Hardware, software, and IT systems 
provided or utilized by federal tenant 
agencies.  This includes all classified 
and unclassified Internet connections 
provided or utilized by federal tenant 
agencies (DHS, 2009) 
Postal Service 
Small- and medium-size packages 
delivered and retrieved by the U.S. 
Postal Service (DHS, 2009) 
Shipping Services 
Small- and medium-size packages 
delivered and retrieved by the 
commercial courier services (DHS, 
2009) 
Organizational Connections 
Sharing of information, intelligence, 
products or services within and 
between organizational elements 
Human and Social Factors 
Human and social behaviors that exist 
within the facility and between facilities 
and should be considered from a 
security perspective 
 
2. Step 2: Determine the Overall Value and Points for all Primary Factors 
Step 2 begins with using the current scoring tables included in the Facility Security 
Level Determinations for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard.  
This step would now include an interdependency scoring table to accurately determine the 
appropriate points that should be assigned to the additional “Interdependencies” factor.  
Table 15 shows the recommended value, points, criteria, and examples that can be as 
scoring criteria.  This table is modeled after the current scoring criteria for the mission  
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criticality, symbolism, facility population, facility size, and threat to tenant agencies factors.  
Therefore, the “Interdependency” factor can be assessed in the same manner as the five 
current factors. 
 
Table 15.   Recommended Interdependency Scoring Table for the Facility Security Level 
Calculation 
Value Points Criteria Examples 
Very High 4 
Interdependencies support a facility that 
must remain operational at all times to 
support National Essential Functions or 




communications centers for National 
Essential Functions or Essential Functions 




Interdependencies support Continuity of 
Government or Continuity of Operations for 
National Essential Functions or Essential 
Functions of the federal government 
FEMA Emergency 
Operations Center 
Interdependencies support facilities that 
provide one-of-a-kind or few-of-a-kind 
services or products for National Essential 
Functions or Essential Functions of the 
federal government 
Centers for Disease 
Control and 
Prevention 
Redundancies in one or more critical 
infrastructure support element are required 




Interdependencies support a facility that 
must remain operational at all times to 
support Essential Functions of the federal 
government 
National headquarters 
for federal agencies 
Interdependencies support 
communications centers for Essential 





Interdependencies support Continuity of 
Government or Continuity of Operations for 
Essential Functions of the federal 
government 
COOP sites for 
national headquarters 
elements 
Interdependencies support facilities that 
provide one-of-a-kind or few-of-a-kind 
services or products for Essential 
Functions of the federal government 
Judicial facilities     
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Value Points Criteria Examples 
Redundancies in one or more critical 
infrastructure support element are required 






Interdependencies support a facility that 





Redundancies in one or more critical 
infrastructure support element would 





Interdependencies support a facility that 
provides local functions of the government 
Local administrative 
offices 
Redundancies in one or more critical 
infrastructure support element are not 
required to maintain mission performance 
Local storage facilities 
3 Step 3: Utilize a Modified Facility Security Level Calculation Matrix 
Option III maintains the same basic Facility Security Level calculation matrix and 
equal weighting of all the current factors.  FPS security inspectors would use the current 
process and scoring matrices for the factors of mission criticality, symbolism, facility 
population, facility size, and threat to tenant agencies.  Option III recommends adding the 
“Interdependencies” factor as a sixth equally-weighted factor.  Rating interdependencies is 
directly related to the mission criticality element of the Facility Security Level calculation. 
The more critical the mission is within a particular federal facility, the more critical it is to 
assess the risks associated with interdependencies.  For example, a facility that houses a 
federal agency engaged in National Essential Functions should require a detailed 
identification and analysis of interdependencies to ensure those interdependencies are 
protected in order to maintain mission accomplishment.  Such protective measures may be 
identified and implemented by increasing the Facility Security Level.  Therefore, the 
“Interdependencies” factor of the calculation is assessed immediately after “Mission 
Criticality.”   
Table 16 shows the proposed Facility Security Level Calculation Matrix. 
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Table 16.   Proposed Facility Security Level Calculation Matrix (After Interagency 
Security Committee, 2008, p. 6) 
  Points 
Score 
Factor 1 2 3 4 
Mission Criticality LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH 
  
Interdependencies LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH 
  
Symbolism LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH 
  
Facility Population <100 101-250 251-750 >750 
  










Threat to Tenant 
Agencies LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH 
  
  
        
Sum of above 
Facility Security 









Justification +/-1 FSL 
Final FSL 
4. Step 4: Utilize a Modified Rating Scale to Determine the Preliminary 
Facility Security Level 
Option III includes a minor modification to the scale for assigning a preliminary 
security level of I through IV.  This option maintains the use of the sum of the six factor  
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scores to determine the preliminary security level.  However, the upper and lower numbers 
of the rating scale are increased to 24 and six, respectively, to account for adding a sixth 
factor to the calculation.   
Maintaining the current point scale without significant modification, while still 
adequately addressing interdependencies, is a very important matter.  Facility Security 
Levels for approximately 9000 federal facilities under the purview of FPS were all re-
calculated during fiscal year 2009 using the current calculation.  Adjusting the Facility 
Security Level scale would require re-calculating all the Facility Security Levels once again 
and could potentially lead to significant changes for many facilities.  Table 17 shows the 
modified rating scale with associated Facility Security Levels. 
Table 17.   Modified Rating Scale for Determining Facility Security Levels (After 
Interagency Security Committee, 2008, p. 6) 
Facility Security 
Level I II III IV 
Sum of Factor 
Ratings 6-7 Points 8-12 Points 13-17 Points 18-24 Points 
5. Step 5: Determine Changes in the Preliminary Facility Security Level 
Based on Intangible Factors 
Option III maintains the current “Intangible Factors” element to be used at the 
discretion of the FPS security inspector.  Certain factors may necessitate the adjustment of 
the Facility Security Level up or down one level.  For example, an FPS security inspector 
may determine there is an interdependency associated with the facility being assessed that is 
not listed among the 10 common interdependencies.  The security inspector may still use the 
“Intangible Factors” element to adjust the final Facility Security Level.  Additionally, the 
“Intangible Factors” element may still be used for conditions related to the facility that may 
not be accounted for in the six primary elements (ISC, 2008, pp. 13–14). 
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6. Step 6: Determine the Final Facility Security Level 
The final step of Option III is to determine the final Facility Security Level by 
adding the scores from the six equally-weighted elements and adjusting the level one point 
higher or lower according to the “Intangible Factors” assessment (ISC, 2008, p. 6). 
The output of this entire calculation would be a Facility Security Level that now 
accounts for 10 common interdependencies and is adjusted to increase security 
countermeasures to protect the facility from threats and vulnerabilities associated with 
interdependencies. 
E. ASSESSMENT AGAINST EVALUATION CRITERIA 
As stated in the introductory chapter, each policy option is assessed using five 
evaluation criteria. These criteria are compliance with standards, effectiveness, 
implementation, institutional acceptability, and time.  Table 18 summarizes the assessment 
of Option III against these criteria.  A brief review of the criteria is provided after the table 
to facilitate understanding. 












1. Compliance with Standards 
Option III is partially compliant with the NIPP and the NIPP risk management 
framework. This option complies with the NIPP recommendation to inventory 
interdependencies during the “Identify Assets, Systems, and Networks” step of the risk 
management framework.  Using Option II the FPS security inspector would identify 10 




document the capabilities provided to the facility by the interdependency, links within the 
facility and with other facilities, and the consequence cost to the tenants in terms of 
interdependency failure or replacement.   
The interdependency data would then be assessed in compliance with the NIPP 
recommendation that interdependencies should be analyzed using expert judgment or 
modeling and simulation during the “Assess Risks” step of the risk management framework 
(DHS, 2006, pp. 12, 31–32, 37; DHS, 2009, pp. 9, 17, 21, 29–32, 35–37).  The FPS security 
inspector would use expert judgment in assessing the interdependency in order to determine 
the overall value and points that should be assigned to the “Interdependencies” factor. 
Option III is partially compliant with the NIPP because it does not address 
interdependency networks.  The NIPP directs Sector-Specific Agencies to consider relevant 
cross-sector interdependencies when developing Sector-Specific Plans (DHS, 2006, p. 12; 
DHS, 2009, pp. 9, 17, 21).  Modifying only the Facility Security Level Determinations for 
Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard does not expand the 
interdependency assessment beyond the facility being assessed. 
Option III is also partially compliant because it does not produce security 
countermeasure recommendations that are specific to each of the 10 common 
interdependencies in accordance with steps four and five of the NIPP risk management 
framework (Prioritize and Implement Protective Programs) (DHS, 2006, pp. 12, 31–32, 37; 
DHS, 2009, pp. 9, 17, 21, 29–32, 35–37).  The only outcome of Option III is the Facility 
Security Level.  While this level is used to select security countermeasures in accordance 
with Interagency Security Committee standards, those countermeasures are not necessarily 
directed to mitigate potential risks associated with interdependencies.  Additionally, the 
Facility Security Level is primarily used as a categorization tool, not a complete risk 
analysis too.  Therefore, modifying only the Facility Security Level calculation falls short of 
properly analyzing the interdependencies.  
2. Effectiveness 
Option III is assessed as resulting in a medium level of risk reduction.  This option 
will improve the security of one federal facility because interdependencies for that particular 
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building will be factored into the assessments.  In order to be assessed as providing a high 
level of risk reduction, this option would have to incorporate the assessment of multiple 
federal facilities and their associated interdependencies.  The Facility Security Level 
Determinations for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard was 
designed for the assessment of only one facility or one cluster of federal facilities (called a 
federal center or campus) and would have to be significantly revised to include 
interdependencies across multiple federal facilities (ISC, 2008, p. 14). 
3. Implementation 
Implementation of Option III is assessed as being moderately difficult because it will 
require the revision of only one standard.  This option takes advantage of using the current 
Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security 
Committee Standard framework.  Rather than recommending a complete revision of the 
Facility Security Level calculation, Option III incorporates NIPP-compliant 
interdependency identification into the current process.  A critical element of 
implementation will be additional training for the FPS security inspectors in the field.  They 
will need to learn how to identify the 10 common interdependencies suggested in this option 
and how to analyze those interdependencies within the revised Facility Security Level 
calculation included in this chapter. 
4. Institutional Acceptability 
The acceptability rating for Option III is assessed as low.  Option III is not expected 
to be readily accepted by FPS security managers and inspectors for two reasons.  One, the 
Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security 
Committee Standard was published in February 2008, just one year prior to the writing of 
this thesis.  FPS managers are not expected to be willing to modify the Standard so soon 
after it has been published. 
Second, the Facility Security Levels for all 9000 federal facilities under the purview 
of FPS were re-calculated during fiscal year 2009 using the current Standard.  FPS is not 
expected to be willing to re-calculate the Facility Security Levels using a new standard.  A 
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possible resolution for this issue is to incorporate the changes recommended in Option II 
into the three-year and five-year recurring Building Security Assessment schedule. 
5. Time 
Option III is assessed as requiring a minor time investment.  Overall development 
and implementation of the recommendations are expected to take less than two years.  
Modifying the Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities: An Interagency 
Security Committee Standard will require approximately six months for incorporating these 
recommendations and publishing the new Standard.  Approximately six months will be 
required for the 11 regional Law Enforcement and Security Program Managers to be trained 
in the new methodology and for these managers to train the FPS security inspectors in their 
respective regions. 
F. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Option III would produce a Facility Security Level determination that is adjusted 
according to the interdependencies associated with the facility.  The assumption is that a 
higher security level would lead to the implementation of additional security measures, thus 
adequately addressing the potential risks associated with interdependencies.  However, this 
option falls short of accounting for and modeling the network formed by the 
interdependencies and the potential effects on security across this network.   
Option III would provide FPS with an acceptable and moderately difficult 
methodology to incorporate interdependency identification.  This option relies on the use of 
the expert analysis per the NIPP.  It may be an acceptable alternative because it involves a 
simple analysis of interdependencies without the aid of sophisticated modeling and 
simulation tools.  While the outcome provides less detail than a more sophisticated 
modeling and simulation approach may provide, Option III is practical from the 
implementation and time perspectives (DHS, 2006, p. 37; DHS, 2009, pp. 4, 17, 35). 
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V. OPTION IV: DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL 
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION TO OPTION IV 
Option IV recommends a regional, network-based risk analysis methodology with 
which FPS can adequately model interdependency networks and provide recommendations 
to reduce the overall risk to the federal facilities network.  This strategy would expand the 
current building-centric strategy utilized by FPS to include an analysis of the 
interdependency networks formed by federal facilities and related critical infrastructure.  
Such a strategy would meet the intent of the NIPP risk management framework, which is to 
identify interdependencies and then analyze them using modeling and simulation (DHS, 
2006, pp. 31–32, 37).  The identification phase of the NIPP framework would begin with 
FPS security inspectors collecting interdependency data and documenting it in the Facility 
Security Level calculations and security assessments conducted for each federal facility 
(Option II and III of this thesis).  This data would also be used with a modeling tool to show 
which federal locations and related critical infrastructure should be the priorities for 
protecting National Essential Functions, Essential Functions of Government, or mission-
essential functions for a particular federal agency.  The outcome would be a regional, 
network-based security assessment that would be used to direct the allocation of finite 
security resources. 
B. OVERVIEW OF OPTION IV 
Option IV is a four-phase approach to assessing the security of federal facilities.  
Figure 4 shows the process diagram associated with these four phases and the following 
paragraphs provide a summary of each phase. 
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Figure 4.   Four Phases of Option IV 
Phase 1: Implement Option III of this thesis, which recommends modifying the 
Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security 
Committee Standard to include interdependency data collection and analysis in determining 
the security level for federal facilities.  This interdependency data would be used in Phases 2 
and 3 of Option IV. 
Phase 2: Implement Option II of this thesis, which recommends modifying FPS 
Directive 07-004, Building Security Assessment Program, to include the identification and 
analysis of interdependency data and making security countermeasure recommends based 
on this data.  These countermeasure recommendations would be tactical-level 
recommendations based on expert analysis of the 10 common interdependencies 
recommended in this thesis.   
Use interdependency data in Option II  
as part of risk analysis  
and countermeasure selection  
Output 
Building Security 




Conduct regional security 
working group analysis Output 
Use Option III to calculate the 
 FSL using interdependency  
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Conduct modeling of interdependency 
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Phase 3: Use a modeling tool, with data collected during Phases 1 and 2 of this 
option, to model the interdependency network formed by federal facilities.  The intended 
output of the tool would be a broad strategic-level view of federal facility and infrastructure 
networks so FPS security inspectors and managers can make informed decisions about 
protecting critical nodes of the network vice individual facilities in isolation. 
Phase 4: Regional security assessment working groups analyze strategic- and 
operational-level interdependency networks and make funding recommendations for 
protecting critical hubs in the network. 
C. KEY ELEMENTS OF OPTION IV 
Three elements of Option IV make it a more strategic and comprehensive approach 
to securing federal facilities than the current FPS methodology.  These elements are the 
regional, network-based approach; the scalability of the strategy; and the building block 
approach used in execution of this strategy. 
1. Regional, Network-Based Approach 
The regional, network-based approach expands the security assessment perspective 
from a single federal facility out to multiple facilities, multiple critical infrastructure sectors, 
and the networks that connect these facilities and sectors.  Utilizing such an approach 
expands the current facility-centric security assessments out to the operational and strategic 
levels of FPS and the Government Facilities Sector.  This is a key element of Option IV and 
a major improvement to the FPS security assessment methodology because federal facilities 
do not exist in isolation and all federal agencies do not operate independent of one another. 
2. Scalability 
The regional, network-based approach is scalable and can be defined in a manner 
that is applicable to any organizational level within FPS or in a manner that best suits any 
particular purpose of a security assessment.  For example, the regional, network-based 
perspective may be defined geographically, organizationally, according to physical 
connections, or according to human or social factors.    
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A geographic perspective may be defined by an assessment of a particular city, part 
of a state, a large region of the country, or even the entire country.  Several examples help 
explain the geographic scalability of Option IV.  An FPS supervisor at the operational level 
may use Option IV to analyze a network of federal facilities within a major city such as 
Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, or Chicago.  An FPS regional director, who has 
responsibility for multiple states, may use this option to analyze an interdependency 
network that spans his or her area of responsibility.  FPS headquarters personnel may even 
use this option to conduct a broad, nation-wide analysis of federal facilities. 
An organizational perspective also may be used for this regional, network-based 
security assessment option.  For example, a particular federal agency may request that FPS 
conduct an analysis of how best to protect their multiple federal office locations.  Such a 
perspective could inform how best to allocate that agency’s security funding to protect and 
preserve overall mission accomplishment, determine the critical and mission-essential assets 
of the agency, and provide data for improving or modifying continuity of operations plans. 
Physical connections can be defined as tangible linkages between federal facilities 
and other critical infrastructure sectors that provide services or products to the federal 
government.  Such connections include electrical power, natural gas and water supplies, 
information technology assets and networks, and postal and shipping services.  Physical 
connections form the interdependency backbone for federal operations and support the 
overall business of government in providing services to the public and between agencies. 
Human and social perspectives may be used to identify and analyze the human 
connections that cross organizational and geographic boundaries.  Both formal and informal 
collaboration networks exist within large organizations and between organizations.  
Oftentimes collaboration networks enable and improve how agencies accomplish their 
missions, but these networks are not analyzed to determine how critical they are to the 
functioning of an organization.  For example, FPS relies on the assistance of local police 
departments for law enforcement response to remote locations or federal offices where FPS 
does not have personnel.  Most of this local assistance is provided through informal human 
and social networks formed without the aid of formal written agreements between  
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organizations.  It may be beneficial from a security perspective to identify these human and 
social networks, analyze the connections that exist, and determine if critical information 
hubs exist that may need to be protected. 
The scalability of Option IV also facilitates combining all four of these perspectives 
into the analysis.  A security manager or inspector at any FPS organizational level can use 
data from all perspectives to identify the critical infrastructure elements, regardless of the 
type, and determine how best to protect the agencies and their critical assets. 
3. Building Block Approach 
The building block approach used in Option IV is the underpinning of the data 
collection and analysis of this scalable, network-based strategy.  FPS security inspectors 
collect and document data at the tactical level when they conduct their on-site security 
assessments and document the interdependency data in the Facility Security Level 
calculation and Building Security Assessment.  This data spans the geographic, 
organization, physical, and human and social connection elements of the interdependency 
networks and can be used effectively in which ever analysis perspective is chosen by any 
level of the FPS organization.  In other words, the interdependency data collected at the 
tactical level for each federal facility builds the data foundation for security analyses that 
can be performed at the operational and strategic levels of the FPS organization. 
D. DETAILS OF OPTION IV 
Option IV recommends utilizing Options II and III of this thesis at the tactical level 
of the FPS security assessment strategy and then adding the use of a modeling tool at the 
operational level to determine interdependency-related vulnerabilities and the utilization of 
regional security assessment working groups to recommend appropriate security resource 
allocation strategies.  This option utilizes the bottom-up approach described in the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan and the building block approach previously described in this 
chapter. 
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1. Phase 1 
Phase 1 of a regional, network-based security assessment strategy is the first 
building block of this option.  Option III of this thesis, which recommends modifying the 
Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security 
Committee Standard, would be used in its entirety.  Option III recommends that FPS include 
interdependencies in the Facility Security Level calculation for each federal facility.   
Calculating the Facility Security Level is the first step in the FPS security 
assessment process and would be an appropriate first building block of Option IV.  By 
implementing Option III as Phase 1 of a regional, network-based security assessment 
strategy, an FPS security inspector would collect and document data for the 10 common 
interdependencies listed in Option III.  Two outputs from this phase are critical to this 
option.  First, the Facility Security Level would be appropriately calculated with the 
addition of interdependency data as one of the six equally-weighted factors.  This modified 
calculation may increase the Facility Security Level for federal facilities that have critical 
interdependencies and thus require more security countermeasures to protect the facility. 
The second output would be interdependency data that would be used in the 
subsequent phases of Option IV.  This data would be used in the modified Building Security 
Assessment (Option II of this thesis), the interdependency modeling, and the regional 
security assessment working group analysis.  As a reminder to the reader, Table 19 shows 
the data that would be collected during this phase in order to calculate the Facility Security 
Level using the 10 common interdependencies. 
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Table 19.   Common Interdependencies for Federal Facilities 
Interdependency Definition 
Electrical Power Primary and backup electrical power sources 
Natural Gas Supply Primary natural gas supply 
Water Supply Primary water supply 
Waste Water Disposal Primary wastewater disposal system 
Communications 
Voice services provided from or utilized 
by federal tenant agencies.  These 
include terrestrial, satellite, and 
wireless transmission systems (DHS, 
2009) 
Information Technology 
Hardware, software, and IT systems 
provided or utilized by federal tenant 
agencies.  This includes all classified 
and unclassified Internet connections 
provided or utilized by federal tenant 
agencies (DHS, 2009) 
Postal Service 
Small- and medium-size packages 
delivered and retrieved by the U.S. 
Postal Service (DHS, 2009) 
Shipping Services 
Small- and medium-size packages 
delivered and retrieved by the 
commercial courier services (DHS, 
2009) 
Organizational Connections 
Sharing of information, intelligence, 
products or services within and 
between organizational elements 
Human and Social Factors 
Human and social behaviors that exist 
within the facility and between facilities 
and should be considered from a 
security perspective 
2. Phase 2 
Phase 2 would be the second building block of a regional, network-based security 
assessment strategy.  Option II of this thesis, which is a modification of the current Building 
Security Assessment process, would be used in its entirety.  A modified Building Security 
Assessment would include interdependency identification and analysis for the facility being 
assessed.  The primary outcome of Option II would be recommendations for appropriate 
security countermeasures that reduce the risks associated with interdependencies.  These 
tactical-level, building-specific countermeasure recommendations would be based on the  
 
 64
expert analysis of the 10 common interdependencies recommended in this thesis, would 
provide valuable data for the interdependency modeling, and would inform the analysis to 
be conducted in Phase 4 of this option. 
3. Phase 3  
Data collected during Phases 1 and 2 of this option and the resultant outputs and 
outcomes would be used to model the interdependency network formed by federal facilities 
and other critical infrastructure.  This phase would be conducted at the operational level of 
FPS by Regional Security Assessment Working Groups.  The purpose of the working 
groups would be to serve as the primary oversight and decision-making bodies within an 
FPS region for risk analysis and security countermeasure funding at the operational level 
and to influence the allocation of security funding at the strategic level of FPS.  The 
working group would be chaired by the deputy regional director and membership would 
include the risk management branch chief, the threat management branch chief, the program 
manager for law enforcement and security programs, and district commanders.  Rather than 
the current FPS process whereby operational-level managers simply review Building 
Security Assessments, the Regional Security Assessment Working Group would be fully 
engaged in the risk analysis process, in particular Phases 3 and 4 of this option. 
An analysis of existing modeling tools and a recommendation for a specific tool that 
could be used by FPS for this phase is outside the scope of this thesis.  However, a suitable 
modeling tool that would support a regional, network-based security assessment strategy 
should have the attributes similar to those used in Model-Based Risk Assessment.  A 
suitable modeling tool would: 
• Accept interdependency data from Phases 1 and 2 of this option.  This data 
includes the 10 common interdependencies recommended in this thesis, 
federal facilities and critical infrastructure as nodes in a network, and 
interdependency links between the nodes (Lewis, 2006, pp. 110–111); 
• Include input data fields for costs associated with the impact of loss (e.g., 
elimination costs and consequences costs) of each node and link (Lewis, 
2006, pp. 110–111); 
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• Incorporate threat and vulnerability data associated with each node and link 
(Lewis, 2006, pp. 112–113); and 
• Allow the user to determine the acceptable level of risk reduction based on 
budget allocation and vulnerability reduction across the entire network or for 
a specific node or link (Lewis, 2006, pp. 119–136, 145–187). 
4. Phase 4 
Regional Security Assessment Working Groups would utilize the outputs of Phase 3 
to analyze strategic- and operational-level interdependency networks and make funding 
recommendations for protecting critical hubs in the federal network.  The intent of the 
Working Groups’ analysis is to protect the National Essential Functions and Essential 
Functions of Government by identifying the critical federal hubs that support these 
functions.  Their risk analysis and the subsequent security countermeasure recommendations 
and funding should remain at the strategic and operational levels, and not duplicate the 
tactical-level, building-specific countermeasure recommendations that are produced by 
Phase 2 of this option. 
The security countermeasure recommendations made by the Regional Security 
Assessment Working Groups may include funding for and the protection of critical 
infrastructure elements outside the Government Facilities Sector.  The outcome of this 
option may include security vulnerabilities related to interdependencies that exist in one of 
the other seventeen critical infrastructure sectors.  Therefore, the Working Group would 
serve as a strategic- and operational-level body that conducts cross-sector collaboration to 
protect risks associated with these interdependencies. 
The Regional Security Assessment Working Groups would also serve as the 
strategic-level collaborators for federal security funding across multiple federal agencies.  
Currently this type of collaboration is primarily conducted at the FPS headquarters level (the 
strategic level) and by the individual FPS security inspectors (the tactical level).  While 
some collaboration occurs at the FPS regional offices (the operational level), a gap still 




and thus interdependency security risks are not addressed.  The Working Group would 
formally fill this gap and provide the regional view of the federal facility network and the 
interdependencies associated with that network. 
E. ASSESSMENT AGAINST EVALUATION CRITERIA 
As stated in Chapter II, each policy option was assessed using five evaluation 
criteria.  These criteria are compliance with standards, effectiveness, implementation, 
institutional acceptability, and time.  Table 20 summarizes the assessment of Option IV 
against these criteria. 





Effectiveness Implementation Institutional Acceptability Time 
IV Compliant High Very difficult Medium Major investment 
1. Compliance with Standards 
Option IV is compliant with the NIPP and the NIPP risk management framework.  
This option complies with both the NIPP recommendation to inventory interdependencies 
during the “Identify Assets, Systems, and Networks” step and the recommendation that 
interdependencies should be analyzed using modeling and simulation during the “Assess 
Risks” step of the framework (DHS, 2006, pp. 12, 31–32, 37; DHS, 2009, pp. 9, 17, 21, 29–
32, 35–37).  Ten common interdependencies that may exist for federal facilities would be 
identified during Phase 1 of this option.  The analysis and modeling of interdependencies 
would occur during Phases 2 through 4 of this option. 
2. Effectiveness 
Option IV is assessed as resulting in a high level of risk reduction.  Security will 
improve across a network of federal facilities because interdependencies are factored into 
the assessments.  FPS should experience risk reductions at the tactical, operational, and 
strategic levels of the organization.  Tactical, building-specific risks are mitigated during the 
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assessment portions of Phases 1 and 2 of this option.  Operational and strategic risks are 
mitigated across a broad geographic region during the modeling and risk analysis portions 
of Phases 3 and 4 of this option.   
3. Implementation 
Implementation of Option IV is assessed as being very difficult because it will 
require significant policy revision and training on the part of FPS.  Phase 1, which 
recommends modifying the Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities: 
An Interagency Security Committee Standard, was assessed as being moderately difficult to 
implement in Chapter Four of this thesis.  Phase 2, which recommends modifying the 
Building Security Assessment process to interdependency data collection and analysis, was 
assessed as being moderately difficult in Chapter Three of this thesis.  Adding the modeling 
of interdependency data and the risk analysis by a Regional Security Assessment Working 
Group to these moderately difficult phases will make Option IV very difficult to implement. 
FPS does not currently utilize any modeling tools so extensive research and testing 
would be required to select an appropriate tool.  New policies and procedures would have to 
be published to direct and guide the phases recommended in Option IV.  Implementation 
would require extensive training for FPS personnel at all levels, including headquarters, 
regional, district, and area level personnel.  Training in all phases of Option IV would have 
to be added to the curriculum at the FPS Physical Security Training Program. 
4. Institutional Acceptability 
The institutional acceptability rating for Option IV is assessed as medium because it 
is expected to be readily accepted by FPS managers at the headquarters level, but not readily 
accepted by regional managers and the security inspectors who conduct the assessments. 
The FPS headquarters risk management division has acknowledged the importance 
of including interdependency analysis in the FPS risk management methodology.  Several 
telephone conversations regarding interdependency analysis as it relates to the Government 
Facilities Sector indicate that FPS headquarters may accept Option IV or a similar 
recommendation (M. Harvey & P. Kacha, personal communication, October 2008 to 
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September 2009).  However, this high level of acceptance at FPS headquarters must be 
balanced with the expected low level of initial acceptance at the operational and tactical 
levels.  Incorporating interdependency analysis in the field will require a significant 
paradigm shift.  Regional, district, and area level directors, commanders, and security 
managers will be transitioning to the new Risk Assessment and Management Program 
during fiscal year 2010.  Implementing Option IV may be viewed as an additional, 
significant change from FPS headquarters and may not be welcomed.  The combination of a 
high level of expected acceptance at FPS headquarters with an expected low level of 
acceptance in the field yields a rating of medium for institutional acceptance. 
5. Time 
Option IV is assessed as requiring a major time investment.  Overall development 
and implementation of Option IV is expected to take more than two years.  Phase 1, 
modifying the Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities: An Interagency 
Security Committee Standard, will require approximately one year to incorporate these 
recommendations and publish a new standard.  Phase 2, modifying the FPS Building 
Security Assessment Program, will require approximately one year to incorporate these 
recommendations and to publish a new directive.  The development and implementation of 
both phases could run concurrently.  Future research will have to determine how long it 
would take to incorporate Option IV into the new Risk Assessment and Management 
Program methodology after it is implemented in the field. 
Developing and implementing Phases 3 and 4 are expected to take more than two 
years.  An appropriate interdependency modeling tool would have to be researched, tested, 
and selected.  New policies and procedures would have to be published to direct and guide 
the phases recommended in Option IV.  Implementation would require extensive training 
for FPS personnel at all levels, including headquarters, regional, district, and area level 
personnel.  Training in all phases of Option IV would have to be added to the curriculum at 
the FPS Physical Security Training Program.  All of these steps would require a significant 
time commitment from FPS as an institution. 
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F. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Option IV is assessed as being the most compliant option with regard to the NIPP 
and the NIPP risk management framework.  This option complies with both the NIPP 
recommendation to inventory interdependencies during the “Identify Assets, Systems, and 
Networks” step of the framework and the recommendation that interdependencies should be 
analyzed using modeling and simulation during the “Assess Risks” step of the framework 
(DHS, 2006, pp. 12, 31–32, 37; DHS, 2009, pp. 9, 17, 21, 29–32, 35–37).  Option IV is also 
expected to result in the highest level of risk reduction when compared to the other options.  
The trade off for achieving anticipated high levels of NIPP compliance and risk reduction 
will be very difficult implementation, a medium level of institutional acceptability, and over 
two years for full implementation. 
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VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, CONCLUSION, AND FUTURE 
WORK 
Chapter VI presents a comparative analysis of the four options presented in the 
previous chapters and the results of this analysis are reviewed.  The preferred option for 
identifying and assessing the network of interdependencies that exists between federal 
facilities and other critical infrastructure is presented and defended in the conclusion.  
Future work related to the implementation of the preferred option is presented at the end of 
this chapter. 
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Chapters II through V each concluded with an assessment of the proposed policy 
option using the five evaluation criteria: compliance with standards, effectiveness, 
implementation, institutional acceptability, and time.  Each policy option was assessed 
independently against the evaluation criteria without comparing the options against each 
other or against the most favorable ratings that a preferred option should receive.   
Table 21 shows the results of each assessment compiled into one table for review 
and analysis.  The reader will notice that a fifth option, titled the “Ideal Option,” was added 
to the table.  The “Ideal Option” represents the preferred ratings for each of the five 
evaluation criterion.  In other words, the “Ideal Option” answers the question, “What ratings 
would a hypothetical, most preferred option receive?”  The “Ideal Option” was used as a 
comparison tool to determine which of the four options presented in this thesis should be 
recommended as the best option. 
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An analysis of the results shown in Table 21 indicates that none of the four policy 
options exactly matches the “Ideal Option.”  Therefore, further analysis was conducted to 
determine which of the four options received evaluation ratings that most closely match the 
“Ideal Option.”  Figure 5 is a graphical representation of the evaluation results and was used 
to compare each of the four options against the “Ideal Option.” 
Figure 5.   Graphical Representation of All Options  
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Option I, Status Quo, was determined to be the least preferable option.  With the 
exception of the rating for institutional acceptability, the line graph tracks opposite of the 
“Ideal Option.” 
Option II, Revise the FPS Building Security Assessment Program, was determined to 
be an acceptable option, although not the preferred option.  The line graph tracks exactly in 
the center of evaluation criteria ratings, making this a middle-of-the-road option.  That is, all 
of the ratings show that Option II would provide a moderate level of improvement to the 
FPS security assessment program by adding interdependency identification and analysis.  
However, this option does not expand the program beyond the assessment of a single federal 
facility in isolation. 
Option III, Revise the Facility Security Level Determination for Federal Facilities: 
An Interagency Security Committee Standard, was determined to be unacceptable as a 
stand-alone option.  Like Option II, the line graph tracks in the center of the evaluation 
criteria rating, with the exception of institutional acceptability which is rated as low.  Option 
III would be considered acceptable either in combination with another option (such as 
Option IV) or if the institutional acceptability rating can be raised at least to a medium 
rating. 
Option IV, Develop a Comprehensive Regional Security Assessment Strategy, was 
determined to be the preferred option.  Figure 6 is the graphical representation of the “Ideal 
Option” and Option IV without the line graphs of the other three options.  One can see from 
this figure that the line graph for Option IV tracks very closely with the “Ideal Option” line 
graph. 
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Figure 6.   Graphical Representation of Option IV and the Ideal Option 
As explained in Chapter II of this thesis, the five evaluation criteria are listed in rank 
order, ranging from compliance with standards as the most important criteria and time as the 
least important.  Option IV was assessed as having the preferable ratings of “compliant” for 
compliance with standards and “high” for effectiveness.  These are the two most important 
evaluation criteria, and Option IV matches the “Ideal Option” for both.  Option IV was 
assessed as being difficult to implement, having a moderate level of institutional 
acceptability, and requiring a major investment of time.  All three of these rating are below 
the “Ideal Option” ratings.  However, these ratings are acceptable given the complexity of 
Option IV.  The literature review for this thesis revealed that interdependency identification 
and analysis is a difficult task.  Implementing all four phases of Option IV would be a 
difficult task for FPS.  However, the benefits gained by complying with the NIPP and the 
NIPP risk management framework, coupled with a highly effective methodology for risk 
reduction, outweigh the difficulty of implementation.  Institutional acceptability can be 
increased with some specific actions that are outlined later in this chapter.  The major 
investment in time will have to be accepted by FPS as a requirement for implementing such 
a dramatic change in its risk management methodology. 
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B. CONCLUSION 
The results of the comparative analysis show that FPS should adopt and implement 
Option IV by developing a comprehensive regional security assessment strategy.  
Incorporating the identification and analysis of interdependencies between federal facilities 
and across multiple critical infrastructure sectors presents a strategic value proposition for 
FPS and other critical infrastructure stakeholders.  First, the security of federal facilities can 
be improved by identifying and mitigating the risks associated with these facilities being 
interconnected and dependent on other critical infrastructure.  Second, the increased 
collaboration between FPS and other critical infrastructure sectors will assist in achieving 
the cross-sector coordination that is called for in the NIPP.  Third, the continuity of 
government operations can be improved by protecting interdependencies that support the 
National Essential Functions and the Essential Functions of Government.  Fourth, individual 
federal agency costs associated with protecting federal facilities may be lowered or costs 
may be avoided if interdependencies can be identified and protected using a more strategic 
and regional approach.  Additionally, the costs and consequences of a successful terrorist 
attack may be reduced by identifying interdependencies and increasing their resilience (Kim 
& Mauborgne, 2006, pp. 23–99). 
The interdependency realm presents an opportunity space for FPS (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 2006, pp. 1–22).  Neither FPS nor any other federal agency is currently 
assessing interdependencies and how the security of federal facilities is impacted positively 
or negatively by the interdependency network.  This opportunity space is available for FPS 
to address from a protection perspective, but it is also available for terrorists and criminals.  
Professor Ted Lewis identified that interdependencies may create unnoticed vulnerabilities 
and seams in the protection of critical infrastructure that can be exploited by terrorists and 
criminals (Lewis, 2006, pp. 7, 62).  FPS should take responsibility for that opportunity space 
within the Government Facilities Sector and related critical infrastructure sectors before the 
terrorists and criminals do so.  After all, the security of federal facilities is the primary 
mission of FPS and no other federal agency is charged with this mission. 
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C. FUTURE WORK 
Five issues should be addressed in the future if FPS adopts the recommendations of 
this thesis.  These issues may have a direct impact on the implementation of the 
recommendations and additional research will be required to properly address all five issues. 
The first issue is that FPS should conduct a demonstration project utilizing Option 
IV of this thesis.  One FPS region should collect and analyze interdependency data and 
determine security resource allocations based on all four phases of the option.  This 
demonstration project would serve to provide qualitative interdependency data from the 
modeling phase of the option and qualitative data related to the effectiveness of this option 
in reducing risk. 
The second issue is how best to engage multiple stakeholders in a comprehensive 
regional security assessment strategy.  Federal agencies continue to view security of their 
facilities in the customary “stove pipe” manner because funding is agency-specific.  Each 
agency budgets for and receives security funding for its own facilities through its internal 
fiscal processes.  These processes are not conducive to the cross-agency, cross-sector 
regional security assessment approach recommended in this thesis.  FPS will have to 
educate its federal stakeholders in this regional-level security assessment process, how to 
apply the FPS regional recommendations to countermeasure funding, and how to implement 
those countermeasures from a regional perspective vice the current agency-specific 
perspective. 
FPS will also have to determine how best to engage non-traditional and possible 
non-federal stakeholders in the regional-level security assessment process.  These 
stakeholders may include representatives from other critical infrastructure sectors that are 
part of the network of interdependencies.  For example, private corporations such as 
electricity companies may need to be engaged in the regional security assessment process if 
an interdependency vulnerability related to electrical power is identified by a Regional 
Security Assessment Working Group. 
The third issue is security countermeasure funding.  The security countermeasure 
funding policy should be modified to provide the Regional Security Assessment Working 
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Groups with flexibility to authorize funding to protect critical federal hubs.  The funding 
policy should also link security countermeasure funding to the annual FPS budgeting cycle 
for the region so critical hubs will receive regional funding vice building-specific or agency-
specific funding. 
The fourth issue is change management at the FPS regional level and within the FPS 
training division.  FPS headquarters should develop a structured management model to 
assist regional staff members with transitioning to the regional security assessment strategy 
and for forming the Regional Security Assessment Working Groups.  FPS training division 
staff should incorporate all of the recommended strategies and policy updates into the 
curriculum of the Physical Security Training Program.  This staff should also form mobile 
training teams to educate regional staff members and security inspectors in the updated 
strategies and policies. 
The fifth issue is incorporating interdependency identification and analysis into the 
Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP).  During the first two quarters of fiscal 
year 2010, RAMP and its associated software and databases will replace the current 
Building Security Assessment process and the FSR-Manager software.  The first iteration of 
RAMP will not include interdependency analysis.  FPS should consider the 
recommendations presented in this thesis and determine if they can be incorporated into 
future iterations of the RAMP methodology.  The new RAMP methodology may be used in 
Option IV and simply replace the process step that includes the soon-to-be obsolete 
Building Security Assessment.  Alternatively, the research and concepts in this thesis may 
be used to develop and implement an interdependency module that can be incorporated into 
RAMP in the near future. 
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APPENDIX 
Critical infrastructure—Assets that are so vital to the United States that their destruction or 
degradation would have a debilitating effect on the essential functions of 
government, national security, the national economy, or public health.  Key 
resources are very similar, but the impact of their destruction or degradation would 
have a minimal impact (U.S. Congress, 2002, pp. 6, 130).  Critical infrastructure and 
key resources (CI/KR) are used synonymously in this thesis to avoid confusion and 
because they are closely related. 
Consequence—The result of a terrorist attack or other hazard that reflects the level, 
duration, and nature of the loss resulting from the incident (DHS, 2006, p. 103). 
Essential Functions of Government—Government functions that enable federal Executive 
Branch agencies to provide vital services, exercise civil authority, maintain the 
safety and well-being of the general populace, and sustain the industrial/economic 
base in an emergency (ISC, 2008, p. 2). 
Federal Facility—Buildings and facilities owned or leased in the United States and occupied 
by Federal Executive Branch agencies excluding most Department of Defense 
activities (ISC, 2008, p. 2). 
National Essential Functions—Functions of the federal government that are necessary to 
lead and sustain the nation during catastrophic emergency and must be supported 
through Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government programs (ISC, 
2008, p. 2). 
Risk—A measure of potential harm that encompasses threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence; the expected magnitude of loss due to a terrorist attack, natural 
disaster, or other incident, along with the likelihood of such an event occurring and 
causing that loss (DHS, 2006, p. 105). 
Risk Management Framework—A planning methodology that outlines the process for 
setting security goals; identifying assets, systems, networks, and functions; assessing 
risks; prioritizing and implementing protective programs; measuring performance; 
and taking corrective action. Public and private sector entities often include risk 
management frameworks in their business continuity plans (DHS, 2005, p. 105). 
Sector-Specific Agency—Federal department or agency that is responsible for critical 
infrastructure protection of a specific sector (DHS, 2006, p. 105). 
Sector-Specific Plan—Plan that augments the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and 
provides specific details for protecting a particular critical infrastructure or key 
resources sector (DHS, 2009, p. 111). 
Threat—A natural or manmade occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or indicates 
the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment, and/or property 
(DHS, 2009, p. 111). 
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Vulnerability—A weakness in the design, implementation, or operation of an asset, system,  
or network that can be exploited by an adversary, or disrupted by a natural hazard or 
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